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430 18, 15 '" $ 12 ~ ~ 9 I 6 3 0 19C() "0110 1920 1930 ROGER A. PIELKE, JR NINE FALLACIES OF FLOODS 431 1940 1950 "0160 1970 "0160 1990 2000 Hydrological Year on health care shortly after his inauguration, it became an issue of national promi. nence because of his highly visible and influential position (compare Theodore Roosevelt's 'bully pulpit'). Similarly, most policies to deal with disasters are put in place in the immediate aftermath of an extreme event. According to Hilgartner and Bask (1988), drama, novelty and saturation, and culture and politics also influence what becomes defined as a social problem and what does not. A disaster or extreme event can serve to open a 'window of opportunity' for change (Ungar, 1995; Solecki and Michaels, 1994). At this time agents of change ought to be prepared with a well-defined plan of action. As Downs (1972, p. 40) notes, following a window of opportunity for change soon follows 'a prolonged limbo - a twilight realm of lesser attention or spasmodic recurrences of interest'. Consequently, those with an interest in improving policy outcomes with respect to floods ought to have a plan of action ready for when conditions do become favor- able for policy change. But it is often the case that communities are surprised by floods, and are therefore unprepared to respond effectively (Solecki and Michaels. 1994). This means that efforts of floo,d policy advocates will be enhanced with an ability to recognize and cap-italize on a window of opportunity. Thus. while knowledge of the flood problem is not a sufficient condition for action, knowledge is a necessary element of a rational plan put forward at the right time, to those with authority and interest to act. One example of this is that the recommendations of the IFMRC (1995) were in large part incorporated into the FEMA National Mitigation Strategy (FEMA. 1995), Here. knowledge plus lhe ftoods of 1993 began to stimulate broader policy change (Thomas, 1997, personal communication). In the absence of an extreme event that mobilizes political action, policy for reducing a community's vulnerability to floods must meet several criteria in a business-as-usual environment (according to Nilson, 1985). First, the threat must be demonstrated (i.e., the problem must be defined). Second, potential responses must be shown to have a signil1cant likelihood of being effective. And third. policy options must not be viewed to impose excessive costs or changes on the commu- nity. Many of the most effective mitigation actions are those which can be taken by the individual, such as a homeowner. Yet, studies indicate that neither improved awareness of hazards nor previous experience with hazards are sufficient to compel people to take actions to reduce their vulnerability (Sims and Baumann, 1983). Figure 4. U.S. Rood damages, 1903-1997, with 25-year running mean. tion may lead to awareness and awareness may lead to behavior' (ibid., emphasis in original). The same phenomenon of knowledge no/leading to action seems to. occur not only with regard to public response to natural disasters but with policy makers as well. Social scientists have explored many of the reason why 'policy happens' and have developed a robust literature (e.g., Olson and Nilson, 1982). From this body of theory and practice one point stands clear: knowledge of a policy problem or solution does not inevitably lead to effective policy action. A number of scholars have explained the dynamics of the transformation of issues onto the public agenda as problems by drawing on an evolutionary metaphor (e.g., Carmines and Stimson, 1989). Issues emerge from a 'policy primeval soup' to occupy a place on the public agenda (Kingdon, 1984). Like their biological counterparts, issues 'compete' in a complex environment. In addition, social en- vironments also have a 'carrying capacity' which limits the number of issues that can be considered at one time (Hilgartner and Bosk, J 988). For example, news slories <.:ompete for the finite amount of space on the fronf page of a newspaper, a congressional committee is limited by available time and staff to conduct hearings, and often budgetary considerations constrain the scientific community. Issues 'evolve' according to a number of factors in its environment such as a prominent champion (e.g., the president) or a disaster (e.g., a flood) (see Carmines and Stimson (1989) for discussion). For instance, when President Clinton focused 2.9. THE U.S. FLOOD PROBLEM CAN BE ADDRESSED WITHOUT FEDERAL LEADERSHIP AND SUPPORT Recent trends in public and political opinion that government must be downsized and policy decisions ought to be increasingly made at the state and local level are counter to the needs of an effective response to the U.S. flood problem (d. Wilkins, 1996). While most experts familiar with floods recognize this point, prevailing attitudes of the public and elected officials in recent years have emphasized limiting the role of the federal governmenl in a range of areas. Responses to floods ought