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<br /> <br />430 ROGER A. PIELKE, JR. <br /> 18 <br /> 15 <br />@ <br />"' <br />$ 12 <br />~ <br />@. 9 <br />J 6 <br /> 3 <br /> <br />NINE FALLACIES OF FLOODS <br /> <br />431 <br /> <br /> <br /> <br />on health care shortly after his inauguration, it became an issue of national promi- <br />nence because of his highly visible and influential position (compare Theodore <br />Roosevelt's 'bully pulpil'). Similarly, most policies to deal with disasters are put in <br />place in the immediate aftermath of an extreme event. According to Hilgartner and <br />Bask (1988), drama, novelty and saturation, and culture and politics also influence <br />what becomes defined as a social problem and what does not. <br />A disaster or extreme event can serve to open a 'window of opportunity' for <br />change (Ungar, 1995; Solecki and Michaels, 1994). At this time agents of change <br />ought to be prepared with a well-defined plan of action. As Downs (1972, p. 40) <br />notes, following a window of opportunity for change soon follows 'a prolonged <br />limbo - a twilight realm of lesser attention or spasmodic recurrences of interest'. <br />Consequently, those with an interest in improving policy outcomes with respect to <br />floods ought to have a plan of action ready for when conditions do become favor. <br />able for policy change. But it is often the case that communities are surprised by <br />floods, and are therefore unprepared to respond effectively (Solecki and Michaels, <br />1994), This means that efforts of floo,d policy advocates will be enhanced with <br />an ability to recognize and caphalize on' a window of opportunity, Thus, while <br />knowledge of the flood problem is not a sufficient condition for action, knowledge <br />is a necessary element of a rational plan put forward at the right time, to those <br />with authority and interest to act. One example of this is that the recommendations <br />of the IFMRC (1995) were in large part incorporated into the FEMA National <br />Mitigation Strategy (FEMA, 1995). Here, knowledge plus the ftoods of 1993 began <br />to stimulate broader policy change (Thomas, 1997, personal communication). <br />In the absence of an extreme event that mobilizes political action, policy for <br />reducing a community's vulnerability to ftoods must meet several criteria in a <br />business.as.usual environment (according to Nilson, 1985). First, the threat must <br />be demonstrated (i.e" the problem musl be defined). Second, potential responses <br />must be shown to have. a significant likelihood of being effective. And third. policy <br />options must not be viewed to impose excessive costs or changes on the commu. <br />nity. Many of the most effective mitigation actions are those which can be laken <br />by the individual, such as a homeowner. Yet, studies indicate that neither improved <br />awareness of hazards nor previous experience with hazards are sufficient to compel <br />people to take actions to reduce their vulnerability (Sims and Baumann, 1983). <br /> <br />1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 <br /> <br />Hydrological Vear <br />Figure 4. U.S. Rood damages. 1903-1997, with 25-year running mean. <br /> <br />tion may lead to awareness and awareness may lead to behavior' (ibid., emphasis <br />in original). The same phenomenon of knowledge not leading to action seems to- <br />occur not only with regard 10 public response (0 natural disasters but with policy <br />makers as well. <br />Social scientists have explored many of the reason why 'policy happens' and <br />have developed a robust literature (e.g., Olson and Nilson, 1982). From this body <br />of theory and practice one point stands clear: knowledge of a policy problem or <br />solution does not inevitably lead to effective policy action. <br />A number of scholars have explained the dynamics of the transformation of <br />issues onto the public agenda as problems by drawing on an evolutionary metaphor <br />(e.g" Carmines and Stimson, 1989). Issues emerge from a 'policy primeval soup' <br />to occupy a place on the public agenda (Kingdon, 1984). Like their biological <br />counterparts, issues 'compete' in a complex environment. In addition, social en- <br />vironments also have a 'carrying capacity' which limits the number of issues that <br />can be considered at one time (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988). For example, news <br />stories compete for the finite amount of space on the front page of a newspaper, a <br />congressional commiuee is limited by available time and staff to conduct hearings, <br />and often budgetary considerations constrain the scientific community. <br />Issues 'evolve' according to a number of factors in its environment such as a <br />prominent champion (e.g., the president) or a disaster (e.g., a ftood) (see Carmines <br />and Stimson (1989) for discussion). For instance, when President Clinton focused <br /> <br />2.9. THE U.S. FLOOD PROBLEM CAN BE ADDRESSED WITHOUT FEDERAL <br />LEADERSHIP AND SUPPORT <br /> <br />Recent trends in public and political opinion that government must be downsized <br />and policy decisions ought to be increasingly made at the state and local level are <br />counter to the needs of an effective response to the U.S. flood problem (cf. Wilkins, <br />1996). While most experts familiar with floods recognize this point, prevailing <br />a~titudes of the public and elected officials in recent years have emphasized limiLing <br />the role of the federal government in a range,of areas. Responses to _floods ought <br />