<br />
<br />430 ROGER A. PIELKE, JR.
<br /> 18
<br /> 15
<br />@
<br />"'
<br />$ 12
<br />~
<br />@. 9
<br />J 6
<br /> 3
<br />
<br />NINE FALLACIES OF FLOODS
<br />
<br />431
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />on health care shortly after his inauguration, it became an issue of national promi-
<br />nence because of his highly visible and influential position (compare Theodore
<br />Roosevelt's 'bully pulpil'). Similarly, most policies to deal with disasters are put in
<br />place in the immediate aftermath of an extreme event. According to Hilgartner and
<br />Bask (1988), drama, novelty and saturation, and culture and politics also influence
<br />what becomes defined as a social problem and what does not.
<br />A disaster or extreme event can serve to open a 'window of opportunity' for
<br />change (Ungar, 1995; Solecki and Michaels, 1994). At this time agents of change
<br />ought to be prepared with a well-defined plan of action. As Downs (1972, p. 40)
<br />notes, following a window of opportunity for change soon follows 'a prolonged
<br />limbo - a twilight realm of lesser attention or spasmodic recurrences of interest'.
<br />Consequently, those with an interest in improving policy outcomes with respect to
<br />floods ought to have a plan of action ready for when conditions do become favor.
<br />able for policy change. But it is often the case that communities are surprised by
<br />floods, and are therefore unprepared to respond effectively (Solecki and Michaels,
<br />1994), This means that efforts of floo,d policy advocates will be enhanced with
<br />an ability to recognize and caphalize on' a window of opportunity, Thus, while
<br />knowledge of the flood problem is not a sufficient condition for action, knowledge
<br />is a necessary element of a rational plan put forward at the right time, to those
<br />with authority and interest to act. One example of this is that the recommendations
<br />of the IFMRC (1995) were in large part incorporated into the FEMA National
<br />Mitigation Strategy (FEMA, 1995). Here, knowledge plus the ftoods of 1993 began
<br />to stimulate broader policy change (Thomas, 1997, personal communication).
<br />In the absence of an extreme event that mobilizes political action, policy for
<br />reducing a community's vulnerability to ftoods must meet several criteria in a
<br />business.as.usual environment (according to Nilson, 1985). First, the threat must
<br />be demonstrated (i.e" the problem musl be defined). Second, potential responses
<br />must be shown to have. a significant likelihood of being effective. And third. policy
<br />options must not be viewed to impose excessive costs or changes on the commu.
<br />nity. Many of the most effective mitigation actions are those which can be laken
<br />by the individual, such as a homeowner. Yet, studies indicate that neither improved
<br />awareness of hazards nor previous experience with hazards are sufficient to compel
<br />people to take actions to reduce their vulnerability (Sims and Baumann, 1983).
<br />
<br />1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
<br />
<br />Hydrological Vear
<br />Figure 4. U.S. Rood damages. 1903-1997, with 25-year running mean.
<br />
<br />tion may lead to awareness and awareness may lead to behavior' (ibid., emphasis
<br />in original). The same phenomenon of knowledge not leading to action seems to-
<br />occur not only with regard 10 public response (0 natural disasters but with policy
<br />makers as well.
<br />Social scientists have explored many of the reason why 'policy happens' and
<br />have developed a robust literature (e.g., Olson and Nilson, 1982). From this body
<br />of theory and practice one point stands clear: knowledge of a policy problem or
<br />solution does not inevitably lead to effective policy action.
<br />A number of scholars have explained the dynamics of the transformation of
<br />issues onto the public agenda as problems by drawing on an evolutionary metaphor
<br />(e.g" Carmines and Stimson, 1989). Issues emerge from a 'policy primeval soup'
<br />to occupy a place on the public agenda (Kingdon, 1984). Like their biological
<br />counterparts, issues 'compete' in a complex environment. In addition, social en-
<br />vironments also have a 'carrying capacity' which limits the number of issues that
<br />can be considered at one time (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988). For example, news
<br />stories compete for the finite amount of space on the front page of a newspaper, a
<br />congressional commiuee is limited by available time and staff to conduct hearings,
<br />and often budgetary considerations constrain the scientific community.
<br />Issues 'evolve' according to a number of factors in its environment such as a
<br />prominent champion (e.g., the president) or a disaster (e.g., a ftood) (see Carmines
<br />and Stimson (1989) for discussion). For instance, when President Clinton focused
<br />
<br />2.9. THE U.S. FLOOD PROBLEM CAN BE ADDRESSED WITHOUT FEDERAL
<br />LEADERSHIP AND SUPPORT
<br />
<br />Recent trends in public and political opinion that government must be downsized
<br />and policy decisions ought to be increasingly made at the state and local level are
<br />counter to the needs of an effective response to the U.S. flood problem (cf. Wilkins,
<br />1996). While most experts familiar with floods recognize this point, prevailing
<br />a~titudes of the public and elected officials in recent years have emphasized limiLing
<br />the role of the federal government in a range,of areas. Responses to _floods ought
<br />
|