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<br />received no ~a(ning -- the rl~ing ~trearns or tbe ralnfall ~a~ tbe only
<br />warning. Of thqse recei~ing ~arning, 60 percent ~ere contacted by
<br />la~ enforc~ment officials -- the re~lnder by friends or .trangers.
<br />....a~nings Were by telephone or face-to-[ac', contact. or the aalll~le
<br />~aflwd, 61 percent recei~ed one .~arnlng, 18 percent recei~ed two or
<br />mOre ~~rnings, and 88 percent atternpted to confirm the first ~arnlng.
<br />1'hose "ho cl101bcd the c"-"yon sides had the best chance to ~urvive.
<br />:-tany"hotriedtodriveout.,eredro.,,,,,d.ltlsnotedthatonly26
<br />percent of th.. reCeived messBge. specifiCalLy .aid to go to hlgher
<br />ground. l108t OIe8sage~ indicated generally to ..get out'". So,"" of the
<br />recommendations in thl. study ~~re:
<br />
<br />their le",,1. Mo.t people in tbe flood hazard ~rea .""e &lH~ad out over
<br />~il~s of countryside.
<br />
<br />According to " """,pIe .urvey dter th.. flood, 52 per<:ent re~ei ;"ed
<br />no "arning, 35 percent rec~lved one war~ing, and 13 percent recetved
<br />t~o or more warnlngR. About (,4 percent of thoae "afned were re"ched by
<br />p~r"on"l ~cquaint"nce.. Official "arnings reached about one-half of
<br />those "~rned, or only one-third of the sampled "icti",.. So"", re~eived
<br />two types of w"rnfngs. Many of thos~ "'arned by sirens aho had
<br />conf1r~tlon by ,ace-to-fa~e contact. Al~o.t all had le.. than 2 hout"
<br />"arnlng, some only a f.." ",lnute~. One flash flood ,,-larm strealll gage
<br />
<br />.
<br />.
<br />
<br />Install.1gns
<br />a flood:
<br />Provide prior public education to facilitate public action:
<br />Include c~mpground operators in pl~oning SO la'" enforcement
<br />
<br />indicating the canyon sides should be clllo.bed in
<br />
<br />signal"as
<br />percent of
<br />
<br />ignored as it had a hi. tory of technlcal problelll~. Only 17
<br />those ",ho received no warning evacuated before the flood.
<br />
<br />.
<br />
<br />ca~e of
<br />
<br />.
<br />
<br />Seal off canyon eoCrances to outside traffi~ durlng the
<br />
<br />Of thos.. who got one "afnlng, ~ore than one-thlrd eVacu~ted before the
<br />flood. Abo~t half of tho~e who received t"o .,arnings evacuated before
<br />the flood. Ihis survey reco",",ended that the follo.,ing items be
<br />lncluded in n "Arning Sr"te~:
<br />
<br />officers could concentrate on other ~reas:
<br />
<br />e~ergency: a"d
<br />
<br />.
<br />
<br />Repeat ~arnlng~ to get the mesS"ge Bcr"ss.
<br />
<br />.
<br />
<br />a strong local role in the ~WS ~arning 8y~tem:
<br />
<br />. reliable ~ater level 313rrn,;
<br />
<br />A ~"",!>1e 8un"y w,"8 "",J~ by 7a_1n&,,(33) ..tftd the '"""5 :l~ll
<br />
<br />.
<br />
<br />spotters "ith radios;
<br />
<br />Country flood of Augusc 1976. Tbi>> flood left :,e:'lnd 25 dead, "~ores
<br />Injured and Oll111onsof dollars indalll8.ges. Inthreecounti<!8,nearLy
<br />400 homes wc.c destroyed. This was an earLy ~or~ing flooc with some
<br />co."""'nh1e~ hlt bootween 4 a.l1. ,~nd 7 ~.1l!. on 2 August 1978. Ihere I,ad
<br />been very heavy r~tn on the day b"foTe; there .~as a NWS "~tch the
<br />predo"" afternoon and a "a~ning at 7 p.Ol. More rai:> occurred :luring
<br />the nigbt. Local preparedness officlals, ~fter bdng "letted b,. other
<br />agende" ..nd citizen", trI",d to reach the I>ublic by sire,," or telo-
<br />phone. '<oads, telcrhon<!~, electrldcy, "nJ even the police radio were
<br />'''H. 1'he 10""\ raclU) .t"ti~n "tiS off tl1~ "Ir ,It rho", "()"r~. ~"d~pnr~
<br />did not feel "ut:'lci~n<:ly <:hr.."tened a~ pa9t ,:ood" h..d "ot ,~"~h,,d
<br />
<br />. "..~n1ng notification plana:
<br />. 10ud3peak~r" rather than slrens;
<br />
<br />.
<br />
<br />r@p~"-t~d .,arning. rather than a single ~ernIng: and
<br />24 hour radto hroadca"t in ~mergency.
<br />
<br />.
<br />
<br />DlSSEMI~AI10~ AND RESPO~SE
<br />
<br />ih~ pr~c~din!l ca.~ ~tuJl~" tadtc<1.tc ""= of tl-".c d;fftc"ltics two
<br />
<br />~Arning di~s~mlnation and re"ponse nnd $OOle sugge.tlons for 1~pro~e-
<br />",ent.
<br />
<br />In t"~ Cnch~ L1 ~o\ldre ~ Lver ~ar')":lr>, \Mrntng time (. shan, "nJ
<br />one lwpuliltl'''\ is 9CattHd ~lo"g ~ loc.g "dHO" ""lley bouo",.
<br />
<br />"
<br />
<br />7J
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