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<br />The overall consequences of these decisions to in- <br />dividuals. professionals, and governments are illustrated <br />by a recent earthmoving damage case. In this case, <br />. 'The California Court of Appeals FlI'St District . . . has <br />held that it is the duty of a real-estate broker selling a <br />house to conduct a reasonably competent and diligent <br />inspection of the property and disclose to the buyer any <br />defects revealed by the inspection" (Kockelman, 1986, <br />p.38). <br />In view of the many elements of society that can be <br />held liable following a landslide, it is logical that this <br />liability be perceived as a sigJ'mMlnt threat and serve as <br />an incentive to take mitigative action. As the public <br />becomes more aware of the landslide hazard and the <br />resulting consequences, the chances are increased that <br />individuals and governments will take positive action to <br />prevent excessive exposure to liability. <br /> <br />Information Dissemination <br />Most important in instituting an active mitigation pro- <br />gram is the heightening of public awareness about the <br />problem. There is an inconsistency of information and <br />hazard awareness among the public and in local govern- <br />ments across the state. Many people are unaware that <br />they live where natural disasters could destroy or <br />damage their homes. Many governments are unaware <br />that landslides threaten roads, bridges, utilities, and <br />buildings. In addition, few, if any, legal and statutory <br />mechanisms guarantee the transmission of known <br />hazard information to prospective buyers, and even if <br />owners have access to hazard information, renters are <br />not necessarily informed of a hazard threatening their <br />lives and personal property. Compounding the problem, <br />land-use planning and building-permit agencies serving <br />the public do not always act upon such information even <br />when they have it. Furthermore, it is unlikely that cities <br />or counties will be found liable for landslide damages <br />that result from planning decisions, as long as they <br />make those decisions taking all available information into <br />account. Fmal1y, even if the information is gathered, <br />made understandable to the lay person, and <br />disseminated to the community, citizens may not incor- <br />porate the information into their actions (Olshansky and <br />Rogers, 1987). <br />However, information about Iandsliding as a hazard <br />becomes a powerfu1 determinant of the choice of means <br />to mitigate landslide impacts. Private lending and in- <br />surance have been identified as two important means of <br />impact modification (Olshansky and Rogers, 1987). <br /> <br />financial Aid <br /> <br />Federal and state financial assistance <br />Kockelman 0986, p. ~ states: <br /> <br />34 <br /> <br />aD <br /> <br />stale programs that provide grants, loans, loan <br />. tax credits, tax deductions, depreciation <br />. insurance. revenue sharing, or other financial <br />have a tremendous effect on public and private <br />. Obviously, lbe eD2h1ing 1egisIation for these <br />be amended by lbe U.S. Congress or stale <br />'to provide for site investigations in IandsJide <br />of hazardous areas, or stabilization of <br /> <br /> <br />areas, <br /> <br />among e1ecte<l ofIiciaIs, but equally effec- <br />. . 'disincentives" which act as deterrents <br />and development of hazardous areas. A <br />" could reduce the federal sbare of a gr.mt if <br />to be funded were to be located in a landslide <br />, lbe U.S. Congress. . . introduced pro- <br />lbe Flood Disaster Protedion Act of 1913 for <br />federal benefits from Oood-prone communities <br />not to participate in lbe National Flood In- <br />. In providing loans and gr.mls for disaster <br />e U.S. Congress . . . requires local and stale <br />to eva1uate and mitigate hazards. <br /> <br />itigation as a condition of disaster aid <br />dslide damage costs governments hun- <br />ons of dollars per year. Governments pay <br />through direct assistance, tax deductions <br />losses, and low-cost loans for recovery. <br />, the state and federal government shares <br />ster recovery costs has risen sharply. The <br />. aster Act of 1973 and the Federal Disaster <br />1974 (Public Law 93-288) address this in- <br />en by attaching hazard-reduction conditions <br />. d. Section 406 of Public Law 93-288 was <br />enacted in i4 to encourage identification, evaluation, <br />and mitigati n of hazards at all levels of government. <br />The require ents of Section 406 are triggered by a ma- <br />jor disaster r emergency declared by the President and <br />apply to all s of declared emergencies and disasters. <br />A hazard .. tion clause is incorporated into the <br />Federal Em ency Management Agency (FEMA)/state <br />agreement r disaster assistance, thereby establishing <br />the identifi . on of hazards and the evaluation of hazard <br />mitigation portunities as a condition for receiving <br />federal assi ceo <br />FEMA is sponsible for administering the Section <br />406 require nts and has prepared implementing <br />regulations 44 CFR 205, Subpart M) that spell out <br />federal, sta ,and local responsibilities under Section <br />406. Under the regulation a state hazard mitigation coor- <br />dinator is d signated by a governor's authorized <br />representa e to prepare a hazard-mitigation plan and to <br />ensure its . lementation. The state may establish a <br />group of in . . duals from state and local agencies to <br />assist in p paring the "406 plan:' which must be com- <br />pleted and ubmitted to FEMA within 180 clays after the <br />Presiden' disaster or emergency declaration (FEMA, <br />1986). <br />