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<br /> <br />28 <br /> <br />ies of recovery in several communities have identi- <br />fied some characteristic errors as well as exam pIes <br />of more successful experiences. However, further <br />study is needed of both the short- and long-term <br />economic consequences of various recovery pat- <br />terns and their effects on political stability and <br />cultural development. <br />Distributing the economic loss among a larger <br />unaffected community lessens the severe eco- <br />nomic impacts of natural catastrophes, although <br />this strategy does not directly reduce casualties or <br />damage. Insurance is one common vehicle for <br />redistribution of loss. However, because of the <br />magnitude of the loss from many catastrophes, <br />the capacity of insurance and financial institutions <br />may be inadequate to cover it. Other forms of <br />redistribution are economic assistance from <br />charitable and private disaster organizations and <br />from governments, through tax receipts and inter- <br />national grants. <br /> <br />INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES <br /> <br />Responsibilities for hazard reduction are so <br />widely distributed among such a variety of orga- <br />nizations that coordination - even for sharing of <br />information - is a paramount problem. Much of <br />the essential activity in reducing the impacts of <br />natural hazards is carried out as a sideline by <br />organizations whose main purposes have little to <br />do with hazard reduction. For example, public <br />education for hazard reduction is carried out by <br />the schools, the mass media, voluntary associ a- <br /> <br />tions, and employers. Equipment for research and <br />rescue is borrowed from building contractors, and <br />its nature and locations are seldom known by <br />those directing emergency response. To remedy <br />this situation, government must take a more <br />active coordinating role. Leadership of public <br />officials is essential at all stages of hazard reduc- <br />tion and emergency response. <br />Because most disasters occur intermittently, <br />creating organizations solely for hazard reduction <br />is not feasible. Consequently, sustaining and <br />directing work done as a sideline by organizations <br />with other primary purposes is a problem. Case <br />studies show that difficulties arise in the relations <br />between professional and lay groups; among <br />local, national, and international organizations; <br />between general and special-purpose organiza- <br />tions; between ad hoc and permanent organiza- <br />tions; and among all these groups. Much remains <br />to be learned about promoting communication <br />among organizations and encouraging patterns of <br />coordination that do not stifle the groups in- <br />volved. A key to reducing the impacts of a hazard <br />is understanding how organizations perform be- <br />fore and during an event. This will come only <br />from systematic observation of many institutions <br />as rhey plan for and respond to different hazards. <br /> <br /> <br />NEEDS AND OPPORTUNITIES <br /> <br />One clear conclusion of this analysis is that there <br />are many more opportunities to develop disaster <br />avoidance approaches than there are efforts to <br />