Laserfiche WebLink
<br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />. <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br /> <br />Focus Group Report-Securitv <br /> <br />Chair(s): John PorcolKevin Gerwig: <br /> <br />Reporter: Peter Puglionesi <br /> <br />Major Issues Identified: <br /> <br />I. Access to tunnel shafts, blowoffs, standpipes <br />2. Vendor/construction personnel access <br />3. Large chemical inventories at facilities - target of attack <br />4. Sufficient information or knowledge of where to get info on contamination threats <br />(EPA project underway, how to disseminate?) <br />5. How do we address public perception ofthe risk is very different from the reality <br />and defend against threats as "the act" <br />6. Interruption of chlorine supply due to weather, low inventory levels, source of <br />supply interruption <br />7. Too much public information available on web, ability to access documents via <br />ForA <br />8. Open facility policies can provide opportunity to scope, plan and implement <br />intentional acts. Many reservoirs serve as recreation facilities. <br />9. What is the cost of hardening systems to prevent intentional acts? How do we <br />balance costlbenefit. <br />10. How do we address distribution system points of attack? <br />11. Do we have enough training programs for water industry managers, supervisors, <br />employees on security (& safety...)? <br />12. How do we address coordinated sequential attacks, e.g., disable water system <br />and initiate major fires? <br />13. We don't train engineers for disaster prevention and response issues. <br />14. Are the codes and standards adequate for disaster prevention and mitigation <br />(e.g., none for piping in EQ prone areas, reliability) <br /> <br />Suggestions for Lessons Learned: <br /> <br />1. Use accidental contamination events as a source of lessons learned for intentional <br />contamination incidents <br />2. PA incident where striking employees contaminated supply with chlordane. <br />3. MA incident of mistaken delivery of Ferrous chloride in place of HFS Acid <br />4. CT incident of propane backflow into system via hydrant <br />5. Invite law enforcement out to facility to assist in identifying threats and <br />vulnerability assessment <br />6. Redundancy is needed in many systems where there is sole source of supply (Ia), <br />single conveyance (MA) <br /> <br />2> <br />