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~.JV"" I If I could take your time a moment, this is interesting in relation to our flood plain information studies. Captain Huff, our coordi- nator who was out here during the flood emer- gency, went up in a helicopter one day and checked out for me the bridge failures on Toll Gate and Sand Creeks. After he came back 'dOWll I took our flood plain information report, the technical report, and I said 'Now I'm going to tell you which bridges failed and which did not fail'. with the exception of the Peoria street bridge, \,hich I knm, failed, our report demonstrated that with the floods that did come down Sand and Toll Gate Creeks you could expect that e?ch of the bridges \,e predicted would fail, did fail. In the case of the South Platte itself we had predicted bridge failure of those, as you say, of lesser capa- city. But even more bridges did fail than that, the Hampden Avenue being a prime example of it because of all the debris piled up against those bridges. vfuat did come down, relating back to our flood plain information studies, our hazard area, as t~. Sparks has pointed out, closely fit the actual flood outline. The extreme hazard that we had defined is what we call our 'standard project flood hazard area', an extreme flood but one which can occur in the region as we had predicted. I Our estimate of what came out of Plum Creek was between 40,000 to 50,000 cubic feet a second. Being more precise, there was one figure of 46,000 cubic feet a second. Now this came do~m, I understand, in a 20-foot wave. If this 46,000 cubic feet a second had, relat- ing back to ltr. Sparks' earlier remark about the volume of this thing, if this thing had run for 24 hours at that rate, you would have had 92,000 acre-feet of volume which is approxi- mately half of what we would have stored in Chatfield Reservoir. But this, obviously, did not run at that rate for 24 hours. I think it was over in a matter of three hours or so,