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<br />than is needed because an appropriator who pumps <br />a lot of water in times of abundance is entitled to <br />more water in times of shortages. <br /> <br />Later rulings established that during times of over- <br />draft pumpers can "prescribe" or seize the rights of <br />another water user by showing that they have been <br />adversely using the other's water "notoriously and <br />openly." Under the mutual prescription doctrine, both <br />correlative and appropriative users can be required <br />to reduce their water use proportionately. The <br />doctrine, however, also expanded the incentive to <br /> <br /> <br /> <br />all groundwater users to increase their pumping to <br />establish a record at use that would grant them a <br />bigger share of scare supplies when pumping is <br />restricted. <br /> <br />Subsequently, the courts further limited the use of <br />mutual prescription by prohibiting groundwater users <br />from prescribing the rights of municipal water sup~ <br />pliers with appropriative rights. They also provided <br />ways by which correlative water right holders could <br />de tend their rights trom those seeking to infringe on <br />those rights through prescription. <br /> <br />WHAT THE LEGISLATURE HAS I)ONE <br /> <br />Some regions, rather than turning decision~making <br />over to the courts, have used more standard legal <br />arrangements to locally coordinate pumping or have <br />sought specific regulatory mechanisms for manag. <br />ing groundwater and controlling pumping. With <br />coordinated agreements, pumpers can agree among <br />themselves to limit their pumping and construct <br />infrastructure for replenishing groundwater. But multi- <br />party contracts are alien dillicult to work out with all <br />of the pumpers using an aquifer. <br /> <br />Some general act water districts, while often lacking <br />the authority to directly limit pumping, can construct <br />replenishment works and impose pump taxes and <br />other levies that influence pumping decisions. The <br />districts, however, are not always large enough to <br />include all users within a groundwater basin. <br /> <br />Water replenishment districts can be created to <br />obtain supplemental water supplies to artificially <br />recharge groundwater basins or take the pressure <br />off aquifers by meeting needs with more surface <br />water. These districts also have some authority to <br />limit pumping. To date, there is only one such district, <br />the Water Replenishment District of Southern <br />California. <br /> <br />Special act districts are created by the Legislature <br />in response to specific concerns, with their powers <br />customized to the problems and solutions of a <br />particular basin. For instance, the Orange County <br />Water District statute provides for the district to <br />establish a replenishment assessment, commonly <br />known as a pump tax. The district also sets a limit <br />on the amount each producer can pump. All produc- <br />ers pay the replenishment assessment on water they <br />pump. Those who pump more than their limit also <br />pay an additional fee known as a basin equity <br />assessment. Revenue raised from the two fees is <br /> <br />used to pay for projects that recycle water, cleanup <br />and recharge aquifers. The Legislature has given <br />three other districts authority to establish pump taxes, <br />allowing them to influence pumping without regulat- <br />ing extraction: the Monterey Peninsula Water <br />Management District, the <br />United Water Conservation <br />District and the Santa <br />Clara Valley Water District. <br /> <br />Special groundwater man- <br />agement districts have <br />been established for Fox <br />Canyon, Ojai Basin, Long <br />Valley, Sierra Valley, the <br />community of Mendocino, <br />Honey Lake Valley, Willow <br />Creek in the Pajaro Valley, <br />Mono County- Tri Valley. <br />and five counties - Lassen, <br />Mendocino, Santa Cruz, <br />Sierra and Ventura. <br /> <br />Periodically, California has <br />considered, but not imple- <br />mented. a much more <br />comprehensive ground- <br />water scheme. Early in this <br />century, the California <br />Conservation Commission <br />considered adding ground- <br />water regulation into the <br />Water Commission Act of 1913. The 1957 Water Plan <br />suggested state permitting of groundwater. Follow- <br />ing the 1976-1977 drought, a governor's commis- <br />sion in 1978 recommended comprehensive but <br />locally based groundwater regulations. San Joaquin <br />Valley farmers objected strenuously to the proposal <br />- asserting fhat they did not have enough ground- <br /> <br />9 <br />