Natural Hazard Observer Nov 2005

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The U.S. military is responsible for defending the nation from external threats and it is uncertain that we can depend upon their assistance at all times. The Posse Comitatus Act also limits the use of active and reserve units and federalized National Guard units in support of local law enforcement officials. The National Guard should be a primary resource for state officials, but the restructuring of the guard to support regular forces over- seas has reduced the options for governors. Additionally, the deployment of National Guard troops leaves many state and local police, fire, and emergency medical ser- vices departments, as well as hospitals and other critical services, understaffed. Recovery in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama may be very slow. Thousands of evacuees may not return to the devastated communities. Housing those displaced by flood waters and wind may involve years of support. Most victims lacked flood insurance and those who had it will not receive sufficient reimbursement to rebuild with- out federal assistance. The recovery effort will raise nu- merous issues, especially the issue of whether homes and businesses in the most vulnerable areas should be rebuilt at all. It is argued that some of the most seriously flooded areas, such as the 9th Ward in New Orleans, should be returned to marshland, and recommendations are being made that there should be greater restrictions on develop- ment on the beaches and that more stringent building codes should be adopted and enforced. In Mississippi, officials will have to address the vulnerability of floating casinos. There are a lot of examples of good coastal zone management in the United States. In Florida, for example, studies document the reduction in property losses when building codes are strengthened— lessons were learned from Hurricane Andrew. More attention to vertical evacuation and other measures to reduce the vulnerabili- ties of populations in low -lying coastal areas can also be adopted. A major issue should be whether states should also impose surtaxes on property insurance (as Florida has done) to fund local mitigation programs. Lastly, Katrina will force greater attention to the need to deal with eco- logical damage from catastrophic disasters. Hazardous materials, sewage, and other debris have to be dealt with in order to restore marshlands, waterways, and woodlands. Katrina was a man -made, nature- assisted disaster. The hazard along the Gulf Coast was created by our fail- ing to preserve natural barriers to storm surge, failing to regulate development in the most hazardous areas, failing to adopt and enforce appropriate building standards and codes, and failing to prepare residents for a catastrophic storm. We have an opportunity now to remedy some of those problems by moving people a little further away from the Gulf waters, improving development regulation and construction, and educating residents so they can bet- ter protect themselves and their property. Hurricane Camille's passage is still evident along the coasts of Lou- isiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, and Katrina's passage will certainly leave scars and memories, as well. Hope- fully, in the rush to rebuild, measures will be taken to assure that the next Camille or Katrina will leave fewer scars and less traumatic memories. William L. Waugh, Jr. Andrew Young School of Policy Studies Georgia State University Hurricanes Pam and Katrina: A Lesson in Disaster Planning In the aftermath of 9/11, we were shocked and asked, "How could somebody do this to us ?" Four years later, in the aftermath of Katrina, we similarly ask, "How could this happen to us ?" Hurricane Katrina is the largest natu- ral disaster to strike the United States in decades. Despite that fact, the immediate response to this gargantuan event left us collectively outraged and ashamed. The 9/11 tragedy came like a bolt from the blue. De- spite the ominous winds that first reached our shores in 1993 —with the first bombing of the World Trade Cen- ter —most Americans did not know of the gathering wave of extreme religious hatred that was fast morphing into a killer event. But those who tracked such events issued warnings and the intelligence community and the Defense Science Board, among others, had expressed concerns about terrorism and the ability to detect and deter it. In September 1999, the U.S. Commission on National Secu- rity (the Hart - Rudman Commission) issued its Phase 1 Report on the threat of terrorism, predicting that "Amer- ica will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on our homeland, and our military superiority will not entirely protect us .... States, terrorists, and other disaf- fected groups will acquire weapons of mass destruction and mass disruption, and some will use them. Americans Natural Hazards Observer November 2005 will likely die on American soil, possibly in large num- bers."' In the weeks after 9/11, once the initial shock passed, focus turned to this report and what it had re- vealed about terrorism. Hurricane Katrina was not without its warning signs as well. As a general rule, the disaster research commu- nity is much more confident in its ability to predict natural disasters. For the past several decades, when discussion turned to catastrophic natural events, the community could easily rattle off a short list of the most vulnerable loca- tions in the United States. This list would invariably in- clude such events as an earthquake in Northern California or the Midwest, a tsunami along the Pacific Northwest Coast, or a killer hurricane in Miami or New Orleans. In a sense, such events are easier to foretell: there is a his- torical record of catastrophic natural events that provides clues to location - specific vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, when Katrina finally hit New Orleans, everyone — including those of us who were well - acquainted with the vulnerability of that region —could hardly believe that the so -often predicted "Big One" had finally come. As 9/11 focused attention on the Hart - Rudman Com- mission's investigation, Hurricane Katrina generated con- siderable interest in a smaller, more modest predictor —the 61