Natural Hazard Observer Nov 2005

Home Browse Search

rI Focus on Hurricane Katrina The Disaster That Was Katrina When Hurricane Katrina came ashore on August 29, she ended decades of anticipation. There were few haz- ards in the United States more studied by scientists and engineers and there was ample warning that a strong storm could cause the city of New Orleans to flood. Hur- ricane Camille had demonstrated the vulnerability of coastal communities in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Ala- bama 34 years earlier and the vulnerability of new devel- opment was widely recognized. Additionally, the risk to the residents of New Orleans and the delta country around the mouth of the Mississippi was covered by National Geographic (October 2004) and Scientific American (Oc- tober 2001) magazines, as well as by the popular press. In other words, there were few surprises in terms of the damage and the number of people affected. The failures of the emergency management system to respond quickly and effectively to a catastrophic disaster were also predicted. The scale of the Katrina disaster not- withstanding, the question of whether the U.S. Depart- ment of Homeland Security (DHS) was prepared to deal with a catastrophic disaster was answered. Warnings from state and local emergency managers, scholars, policy ana- lysts, political commentators, and former and current Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) offi- cials that the agency responsible for coordinating the fed- eral response was no longer able to do so were not heeded. FEMA had been stripped of functions and dis- connected from the national networks of governmental and nongovernmental disaster relief organizations upon which the nation has historically depended during major disasters. Funding cuts; transfers of critical elements to other DHS units; changes in policy priorities; changes in plans and procedures and organizational structures without adequate involvement of the professional emergency man- agement and disaster research communities and without adequate investments in training; and a flood of transfers and retirements of experienced FEMA personnel all con- tributed to the loss of emergency management capacity. The "all- hazards" approach that had characterized emergency management during the pre -DHS years was discarded in favor of a counter- terrorism approach. The National Response Plan and other DHS documents, as well as the speeches of DHS leaders, mention all- hazards but are focused on terrorism, particularly terrorism in- volving so- called "weapons of mass destruction." Deci- sions concerning the use of federal assets are made in Washington, rather than at regional or state levels. The problems experienced with the Katrina response reflected the weaknesses of command and control struc- tures. Classic bureaucratic processes can be very effective in dealing with routine tasks in a relatively stable task environment, but are notoriously slow in dealing with the nonroutine and are prone to failure when overloaded. A question that should be addressed is whether the centrali- zation of decision making caused delays in critical deci- sions, such as the deployment of National Guard units, and mismatches between local needs and national actions. Clearly, officials at all levels, from the White House to the statehouses to the city halls, suffered from the lack of communication with local officials and affected areas. A more decentralized approach would have saved time and would have better directed resources where they were most needed. Officials might have looked less foolish had they had access to better information and had they a greater understanding of emergency management. The hazard posed to New Orleans and adjoining par- ishes by the levee system should have been addressed dec- ades ago. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had funding for at least some levee work, but the funding was cut. Officials had funding for an evacuation study, but the money was shifted to other purposes. The evacuation of New Orleans should have hap- pened much earlier than it did and should have included a larger percentage of the residents. The rule of thumb is that 80 percent of residents will evacuate. That percentage might be improved upon by removing as many obstacles as possible for those who do not have the wherewithal to evacuate on their own and /or stay because they will not or cannot leave a relative, a pet, or the possessions that rep- resent their lives. For some, particularly the elderly and poor whose worlds are very small, uncertain risk hardly outweighs the uncertainty of the outside world. Clearly, the Katrina dis- aster revealed the reality of poverty for many Americans and the international community. Statistics on the increas- ing number of poor in America were released only a few days before Katrina, and the disaster demonstrated that there is a large segment of American society that lives without the economic and social resources necessary to protect themselves and their families. Calls to stockpile water and food for four days seem ludicrous to those who barely have enough money to eat everyday. Policy makers and disaster researchers do need to un- derstand the looting and violence that kept responders out of New Orleans and terrorized those trapped in the city for days. Clearly, some were thieves and thugs while oth- ers were victims of the flooding looking for supplies. For- tunately, weeks after the worst of the flooding, there are indications that there were fewer looters than the media and authorities estimated. Explanation for the disappear- ance of hundreds of New Orleans police officers has not been found, although some likely were trying to save their own families. The appropriate role for the military has become a major issue since the early days of the disaster. While the military provided essential security in the city and per- formed search and rescue, they were ill- equipped to pro- vide daily assistance to victims. The U.S. Coast Guard is the exception. Military police, transportation, medical, and logistics units have clear roles in disaster response. Arguments that the military should become the nation's disaster relief organization have raised a number of is- sues, beginning with their availability and their training. Natural Hazards Observer November 2005