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Publications
Year
2005
Title
Colroado Water
Author
Water Center of Colorado State University
Description
October 2005 Issue
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Newsletter
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Reflections on Hurricanes and Other Unnatural Disasters <br />by Jared Orsi, Professor of History, Colorado Sate University <br />urtng the 1998 hurricane season I was in <br />Chicago writing a book about the his- <br />tory of natural disasters. I could not help <br />but notice that what was obvious to me — that <br />natural disasters have a good deal of human his- <br />tory behind them —was anything but obvious to <br />the wider public. As the Chicago Tribune edi- <br />torialized, in the face of "nature's most violent <br />displays of brute force," humans "can do little <br />but watch in awe the 'great mischief of Mother <br />Nature." Two years later, I was living in the tin- <br />derbox known as the American West (the book <br />was still not done), when the forests around Los <br />Alamos, New Mexico, burst into flame after a <br />controlled burn by the National Park Service <br />didn't stay controlled. Instead of blaming nature <br />this time, the papers wanted a hanging. "The <br />Park Service should hold its personnel account- <br />able," the Denver Post opined. "I find it hard to <br />believe," fumed the Los Alamos congressional <br />representative, "that no one is held accountable. <br />Didn't someone make a mistake ?" <br />As I write today, September 23, 2005, one of the <br />worst hurricanes in history has just devastated <br />the coastal regions of Louisiana and Mississippi, <br />and another severe one is apparently bearing <br />down on Texas's Gulf Coast. Yet again we seek <br />answers: Nature's fury? God's wrath? Mal- <br />feasance or at least incompetence on the part <br />of responders —from emergency crews to the <br />President of the United States? Although fingers <br />point in many different directions, these expla- <br />nations and the responses to the 1998 hurricanes <br />and the Los Alamos fire share one thing: the <br />assumption that something must go extremely <br />wrong in order to produce an extreme tragedy. <br />Nature must do something extraordinarily pow- <br />erful, or human beings must make extraordinary <br />mistakes. Although seemingly logical and very <br />understandable given the scale of tragedy that <br />results from natural disasters, this assumption is <br />not borne out by historical evidence. It does not <br />take a big and bad cause to produce a big and <br />bad effect. <br />In the case of Los Alamos, the fire was caused <br />by a complex of unfortunate but unremarkable <br />mistakes and coincidences: the accumulation of <br />ground fuel in the 1990s, the pending retirement <br />of a park superintendent who favored use of fire <br />as a tool in forest management, a drought that <br />portended a bad fire season. All of these ordi- <br />nary things conspired to add urgency in officials <br />mind for the need for a burn in the spring of 2000. <br />But there was more: an out of date protocol for <br />prescribed burning that had been mistakenly <br />posted on the internet, small mistakes in the ad- <br />mittedly imprecise science —no, guess work —that <br />goes into estimating fire safety conditions. And <br />then there was the big mistake that came from <br />the invisible problem of combining the wrong <br />protocol with the small errors in the fire safety <br />rating. Add to this a National Weather Service <br />report that never got to park service officials. All <br />of these conspired to lead officials to pick a very <br />bad day for the fire. Finally there was the chaotic <br />patterns of blowing wind and burning flames. <br />Neither predictable, neither controllable. From <br />all these small, ordinary system failures —fail- <br />ures that can happen on any given day without <br />any severe consequences —came a billion -dollar <br />tragedy. The Secretary of the Interior Bruce Bab- <br />bitt likened it to a series of stones loosened from <br />a mountainside. "Sometimes," he said, "a rock is <br />dislodged and nothing happens, but other times <br />a rock is dislodged and it starts a cascading series <br />of events... [until] you have a landslide at the bot- <br />tom." <br />Hurricanes work similarly, though on a much <br />larger scale. First, human beings with short <br />memories and big plans for the future put a lot <br />of stuff in harms way in the twentieth century. <br />South Florida, for example, enjoyed three decades <br />between Hurricane Betsy in 1965 and Hurricane <br />Andrew in 1992, and during that time, popula- <br />tion and property values skyrocketed. This pat- <br />tern has repeated across the country and around <br />the globe, with the consequence that the severity <br />and frequency of natural disasters has increased <br />steadily since the 1970s. The worldwide price tag <br />2 l <br />
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