Issue #17 The Water Report
<br />Fish & Farms
<br />Reallocation
<br />NRDC
<br />V.
<br />Houston
<br />Injunction
<br />Standards
<br />Reasonableness
<br />Detailed
<br />Discovery
<br />Mitigation
<br />Issues
<br />the economy and population centers of this state have developed in reliance upon appropriated water, it
<br />would be disingenuous to hold that such appropriations are and have always been improper to the
<br />extent that they harm public trust uses and can be justified upon theories of reliance or estoppel."
<br />National Audubon Society, supra, 33 Cal. 3d at 446
<br />Whether the Section 5937 flows that plaintiffs seek comply with the limitations imposed by Article
<br />X, Section 2 of the California Constitution, requires consideration of evidence relating to all aspects of
<br />the comparative unreasonableness and wastefulness of such flows, including evidence relating to the
<br />socioeconomic impacts resulting from the reallocation of this water.
<br />A consideration of the reasonableness of restoration of San Joaquin's historic fisheries is also
<br />required under the CVPIA. In NRDC v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118 (9" Cir. 1998), the Ninth Circuit
<br />determined that the requirement of CVPIA Section 3406(c)(1) — that the restoration of fisheries below
<br />Friant Dam be "reasonable, prudent and feasible" — is a substantive standard. As applied to the
<br />operation of Friant Dam, that standard will preempt Section 5937 if it is not "reasonable, prudent and
<br />feasible" to release the amount of water required by Section 5937.
<br />The Houston court stated that:
<br />"There is no clear directive in the CVPIA which preempts the application of §5937 if the state law
<br />could be implemented in a way that is consistent with Congress' plan to develop and restore fisheries
<br />below the Friant dam in a manner that is "reasonable, prudent, and feasible." CVPIA, Pub. L. 102 -575,
<br />§3406(c), 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) at 4721.
<br />The district court ... did not reach the issue of whether the actual application of §5937 is inconsistent
<br />with the CVPIA. It has yet to be determined how much water release would be required under §5937
<br />and whether that would be consistent with the CVPIA. We remand these issues to the district court for
<br />a determination on the merits." Houston, 146 F.3d at 1132.
<br />Finally, a reasonableness balancing is required because Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief. An order
<br />compelling agency action is, in effect, a mandatory injunction. Firebaugh- Canal Co. v. United States,
<br />203 F.3d 568, 577 (9th Cir. 2000). An injunction "is not a remedy which issues as of course [citation], or
<br />to restrain an act the injurious consequences of which are merely trifling. [citation.]" Weinberger v.
<br />Romero- Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311 -312 (1982). The basis for injunctive relief in the federal courts is
<br />irreparable injury and the inadequacy of legal remedies. Id. at 312, citing Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper
<br />Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 61 (1975); Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944). When opposing parties
<br />present competing claims of injury, "the traditional function of equity has been to arrive at a `nice
<br />adjustment and reconciliation' between the competing claims [citation]. In such cases, the court `balances
<br />the conveniences of the parties and possible injuries to them according as they may be affected by the
<br />granting or withholding of the injunction.' [citation.]" Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 312.
<br />Thus, whether under the California Constitution, the CVPIA, or traditional equitable principles, the
<br />remedies phase of this case must account for reasonableness. In an order issued on June 9, 2005, the
<br />court concluded that "it is appropriate to leave the question of consistency [with CVPIA] open until the
<br />point that the Secretary formally prepares a plan, if one is ever prepared." (NRDC v. Rodgers, Order,
<br />June 9, 2005, Docket No. 1127, Case No. Civ. 5 -88 -1658 LKK, at p. 8.) The court further explained,
<br />however, that "although I decline to decide if the plan is inconsistent with §5937 without an actual plan to
<br />work with, it does not follow that the parties cannot present evidence on what is reasonable and feasible
<br />during the remedies phase." (Id. at p. 9.)
<br />The Reasonableness Component Will Require Wide - Ranging Discovery
<br />Given that the remedies phase of the trial will address the reasonableness of restoration of historic
<br />fisheries, the parties will have to engage in wide - ranging and highly technical discovery. For example,
<br />the parties will have to discover any evidence relating to whether the water that plaintiffs contend must be
<br />released to support fish flows will take water away from the amount that is now available for
<br />appropriation. Similarly, discovery will have to uncover how much water would be lost to those
<br />dependent on water deliveries from Friant Dam, and who will suffer these losses.
<br />Any mitigation of those losses is also an open question. For example, do the plaintiffs contend that
<br />the losses can be made up in whole or in part by some kind of mitigation measures? Can mitigation be
<br />implemented? What is the cost? Will plaintiffs dispute the claims of loss suffered by those who depend
<br />on Friant Dam for their water supply? How much agricultural production do plaintiffs contend will be
<br />lost? How many people do plaintiffs contend will lose their jobs? How many people will lose their
<br />farms? How will public health and safety be impacted in those cities and towns that are dependent upon
<br />this water supply? What effect do plaintiffs contend the fish flow releases will have on the groundwater
<br />table? Will we see the return of the massive groundwater overdrafts that existed before the Friant
<br />Division was built?
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