967 P.2d 1042, City of Colorado Springs v. White, (Colo. 1998)
<br />so candid or personal in nature that public disclosure
<br />is likely in the future to stifle honest and frank
<br />communication within the agency." Coastal States,
<br />617 F.2d at 866; see also Van Aire Skyport Corp.
<br />v. Federal Aviation Admin., *1053 733 F.Supp.
<br />316, 320 (D.Colo.1990). (FN9) Asa consequence,
<br />the deliberative process privilege typically covers
<br />recommendations, advisory opinions, draft
<br />documents, proposals, suggestions, and other
<br />subjective documents that reflect the personal
<br />opinions of the writer rather than the policy of the
<br />agency. See, e.g., Sears, 421 U.S. at 150, 95 S.Ct.
<br />1504; Taxation with Representation Fund, 646 F.2d.
<br />at 677; Coastal States, 617 F.2d at 866.
<br />Is
<br />[13][14] The initial burden of proof falls upon the
<br />government entity asserting the deliberative process
<br />privilege. See Coastal States, 617 F.2d at 868;
<br />Mead Data Cent., 566 F.2d at 251; Vaughn II, 523
<br />F.2d at 1146; Walker & Jones, The Deliberative
<br />Process Privilege, at 300. Because the government
<br />has an obvious advantage over the party seeking the
<br />information, the requirements for assertion of the
<br />pri ✓ilege are rather technical. The procedural
<br />requirements are intended to (1) assure that the
<br />party's interest in the information is not "submerged
<br />beneath governmental obfuscation and
<br />mischaracterization," and (2) allow the courts to
<br />effectively and efficiently evaluate the nature of the
<br />disputed documents. Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d
<br />820, 826 (D.C.Cir.1973) ( "Vaughn I "); see also
<br />Mead Data Cent., 566 F.2d at 251; Walker &
<br />Jones, The Deliberative Process Privilege, at 303.
<br />[15] The government cannot meet these
<br />requirements by conclusory and generalized
<br />allegations of privilege. Most courts require that the
<br />assertion of the privilege be made in the form of a "
<br />Vaughn index, " named for the decision which first
<br />imposed the requirement. See Vaughn I, 484 F.2d
<br />at 826 -27; Walker & Jones, The Deliberative
<br />Process Privilege, at 301. The Vaughn index
<br />requires a specific and detailed assertion of the
<br />privilege, although the index need not be so detailed
<br />that it compromises the purposes served by the
<br />privilege. See Church of Scientology v. United
<br />States Dept of Army, 611 F.2d 738, 742 (9th
<br />Cir.1979); Vaughn I, 484 F.2d at 826.
<br />[16] The Vaughn index should provide a specific
<br />description of each document claimed to be
<br />privileged. See Mead Data Cent., 566 F.2d at 251;
<br />Page 12
<br />Vaughn I, 484 F.2d at 826 -27; Walker & Jones,
<br />The Deliberative Process Privilege, at 301.
<br />Typically, the description should provide each
<br />document's author, recipient, and subject matter.
<br />See, e.g., Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Internal
<br />Revenue Serv., 679 F.2d 254, 258 (D.C.Cir.1982).
<br />Further, the index should explain why each
<br />document qualifies for the privilege, including
<br />descriptions of the deliberative process to which the
<br />document is related and the role played by document
<br />in that process. See, e.g., Mead Data Cent., 566
<br />F.2d at 250 -52; Walker & Jones, The Deliberative
<br />Process Privilege, at 301 -03. The government
<br />should also discuss, in the form of an affidavit, why
<br />disclosure of each document would be harmful. See
<br />Exxon Corp. v. Department of Energy, 91 F.R.D.
<br />26, 43 -44 (N.D.Tex.1981); Smith v. Federal Trade
<br />Comm'n, 403 F.Supp. 1000, 1016 -17 (D.Del.1975);
<br />Walker & Jones, The Deliberative Process
<br />Privilege, at 302. Finally, and especially in the
<br />case of a large document, the government should
<br />distinguish between those portions of the document
<br />that are disclosable (such as purely factual data) and
<br />those that are allegedly privileged. (FN10) See
<br />Vaughn I; 484 F.2d at 827. The index should
<br />subdivide the document into manageable portions
<br />cross - referenced to the relevant parts of the
<br />government's justification for the privilege. See id.
<br />[ 17] [ 18] [ 19] Properly constructed; the Vaughn
<br />index should provide litigants with fundamental
<br />information about the allegedly privileged material,
<br />and provide them with a *1054 meaningful
<br />opportunity to challenge the government's claims.
<br />See Arthur Andersen, 679 F.2d at 258; Vaughn I,
<br />484 F.2d at 825 -26. Additionally, a proper Vaughn
<br />index is an aid to reviewing courts. An in camera
<br />inspection of the disputed material need not
<br />automatically follow upon the claim of privilege.
<br />See Kaiser, 157 F.Supp. at 947 -48; First Judicial
<br />Dist. Court, 629 P.2d at 334; Walker & Jones, The
<br />Deliberative Process Privilege, at 312 -13. Where
<br />the government has met the procedural requirements
<br />for assertion of the deliberative process privilege,
<br />the privilege presumptively applies. See Kaiser, 157
<br />F.Supp. at 947; Capital Info. Group, 923 P.2d at
<br />37; Hamilton, 414 A.2d at 926 -27; Killington, 572
<br />A.2d at 1375; Walker & Jones, The Deliberative
<br />Process Privilege, at 312 -13. In such a case, in
<br />camera inspection of the documents is neither
<br />mandatory nor (where many documents are
<br />involved) practical. See Arthur Andersen, 679 F.2d
<br />at 258. (FN11) The trial court should honor the
<br />claim of privilege unless the party seeking discovery
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