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967 P.2d 1042, City of Colorado Springs v. White, (Colo. 1998) <br />1504; see also Taxation with Representation Fund, <br />646 F.2d at 677. <br />[5][6] Conversely, postdecisional documents, <br />communications made after the decision and <br />designed to explain it, are not protected by the <br />privilege. This distinction is supported by two <br />considerations. First, the quality of a decision will <br />not be affected by forced disclosure of <br />communications occurring after the decision is <br />finally reached. See Sears, 421 U.S. at 151, 95 <br />S.Ct. 1504. Second, the public has a strong <br />interest in the disclosure of reasons that do supply <br />the basis for an agency policy actually adopted. See <br />id. at 152, 95 S.Ct. 1504; Taxation with <br />Representation Fund, 646 F.2d at 678. "These <br />reasons, if expressed within the agency, constitute <br />the 'working law' of the agency," and as such <br />should be disclosed to the public. Sears, 421 U.S. <br />at 152, 95 S.Ct. 1504. (FN8) - <br />*1052 [7] Material that is predecisional in nature <br />normally retains its protection even after the <br />decision is made. See May v. Department of Air <br />Force, 777 F.2d 1012, 1014 -15 (5th Cir.1985); <br />United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 89 F.R.D. 578, <br />583 (E.D:Wis.1981); Walker & Jones, The <br />Deliberative Process Privilege, at 292 -93. Because <br />an agency's final decision is not protected under the <br />privilege, however, predecisional material can lose <br />its protected status if the decisionmaker incorporates <br />the material by reference, or expressly adopts it, in <br />the final decision. See Sears, 421 U.S. at 161, 95 <br />S.Ct. 1504; Bristol - Meyers Co. v. Federal Trade <br />Comm'n, 598 F.2d 18, 23 (D.C.Cir.1978); Walker <br />& Jones, The Deliberative Process Privilege, at 293. <br />[8] The predecisional /postdecisional dichotomy is a <br />useful starting point in determining which documents <br />are privileged. Of course, not all predecisional <br />material is privileged; the material must also be <br />part of the deliberative process by which a decision <br />is made. See Taxation with Representation Fund, <br />646 F.2d at 678; Mead Data Cent., 566 F.2d at <br />257. The material must reflect the "give- and -take <br />of the consultative process." Coastal States, 617 <br />F.2d at 866. In determining whether material is <br />deliberative, courts have distinguished between <br />"advisory materials which truly reflect[ ] the <br />deliberative or policymaking processes of an <br />agency" and "purely factual, investigative material" <br />which is not protected. Mink, 410 U.S. at 89, 93 <br />S.Ct. 827; see In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 737; <br />Schell, 843 F.2d at 940; Wolfe, 839 F.2d at 774; <br />Page 11 <br />see also Martinelli, 199 Colo. at 171, 612 P.2d at <br />1089 (holding that whether privilege applies depends <br />upon whether information sought is factual data or <br />evaluative summary). <br />[9] While the fact /opinion distinction is helpful in <br />determining what is privileged, courts should not <br />"mechanically apply" the test in every case. Wolfe, <br />839 F.2d at 774; see also Schell, 843 F.2d at 940 <br />(noting that fact /opinion distinction "should not <br />serve as a talismanic incantation in every case "). <br />The deliberative process privilege protects factual <br />material that is "so inextricably intertwined with the <br />deliberative sections of the documents that its <br />disclosure would inevitably reveal the government's <br />deliberations." In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 737; <br />see Mink, 410 U.S. at 87 -91, 93 S.Ct. 827; Wolfe, <br />839 F.2d at 774. <br />[10] Courts have also looked to other <br />considerations in assessing whether material is <br />predecisional and deliberative. The function and <br />significance of the document in the agency's <br />decisionmaking process are relevant. See Taxation <br />with Representation Fund, 646 F.2d<'at 678; Coastal <br />States, 617 F.2d at 868. Documents representing <br />the ideas and theories that go into the making of <br />policy, which are privileged, should be distinguished <br />from "binding agency opinions and interpretations" <br />that are "retained and referred to as precedent" and <br />constitute the policy itself. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. <br />Federal Trade Comm'n, 450 F.2d 698, 708 <br />(D.C.Cir.1971); see Coastal States, 617 F.2d at <br />859 -60. <br />[11] Furthermore, courts examine the identity and <br />decisionmaking authority of the office or person <br />issuing the material. See Taxation with <br />Representation Fund, 646 F.2d at 679; Coastal <br />States, 617 F.2d at 868. A document from a <br />subordinate to a superior official is more likely to be <br />predecisional, "while a document moving in the <br />opposite direction is more likely to contain <br />instructions to staff explaining the reasons for a <br />decision already made." Coastal States, 617 F.2d at <br />868; see Taxation with Representation Fund, 646 <br />F.2d at 679 -81; Walker & Jones, The Deliberative <br />Process Privilege, at 291 -92. <br />[12] Finally, in addition to assessing whether the <br />material is predecisional and deliberative, and in <br />order to determine if disclosure of the material is <br />likely to adversely affect the purposes of the <br />privilege, courts inquire whether "the document is <br />Copyright (c) West Group 2001 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works <br />