967 P.2d 1042, City of Colorado Springs v. White, (Colo. 1998)
<br />1504; see also Taxation with Representation Fund,
<br />646 F.2d at 677.
<br />[5][6] Conversely, postdecisional documents,
<br />communications made after the decision and
<br />designed to explain it, are not protected by the
<br />privilege. This distinction is supported by two
<br />considerations. First, the quality of a decision will
<br />not be affected by forced disclosure of
<br />communications occurring after the decision is
<br />finally reached. See Sears, 421 U.S. at 151, 95
<br />S.Ct. 1504. Second, the public has a strong
<br />interest in the disclosure of reasons that do supply
<br />the basis for an agency policy actually adopted. See
<br />id. at 152, 95 S.Ct. 1504; Taxation with
<br />Representation Fund, 646 F.2d at 678. "These
<br />reasons, if expressed within the agency, constitute
<br />the 'working law' of the agency," and as such
<br />should be disclosed to the public. Sears, 421 U.S.
<br />at 152, 95 S.Ct. 1504. (FN8) -
<br />*1052 [7] Material that is predecisional in nature
<br />normally retains its protection even after the
<br />decision is made. See May v. Department of Air
<br />Force, 777 F.2d 1012, 1014 -15 (5th Cir.1985);
<br />United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 89 F.R.D. 578,
<br />583 (E.D:Wis.1981); Walker & Jones, The
<br />Deliberative Process Privilege, at 292 -93. Because
<br />an agency's final decision is not protected under the
<br />privilege, however, predecisional material can lose
<br />its protected status if the decisionmaker incorporates
<br />the material by reference, or expressly adopts it, in
<br />the final decision. See Sears, 421 U.S. at 161, 95
<br />S.Ct. 1504; Bristol - Meyers Co. v. Federal Trade
<br />Comm'n, 598 F.2d 18, 23 (D.C.Cir.1978); Walker
<br />& Jones, The Deliberative Process Privilege, at 293.
<br />[8] The predecisional /postdecisional dichotomy is a
<br />useful starting point in determining which documents
<br />are privileged. Of course, not all predecisional
<br />material is privileged; the material must also be
<br />part of the deliberative process by which a decision
<br />is made. See Taxation with Representation Fund,
<br />646 F.2d at 678; Mead Data Cent., 566 F.2d at
<br />257. The material must reflect the "give- and -take
<br />of the consultative process." Coastal States, 617
<br />F.2d at 866. In determining whether material is
<br />deliberative, courts have distinguished between
<br />"advisory materials which truly reflect[ ] the
<br />deliberative or policymaking processes of an
<br />agency" and "purely factual, investigative material"
<br />which is not protected. Mink, 410 U.S. at 89, 93
<br />S.Ct. 827; see In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 737;
<br />Schell, 843 F.2d at 940; Wolfe, 839 F.2d at 774;
<br />Page 11
<br />see also Martinelli, 199 Colo. at 171, 612 P.2d at
<br />1089 (holding that whether privilege applies depends
<br />upon whether information sought is factual data or
<br />evaluative summary).
<br />[9] While the fact /opinion distinction is helpful in
<br />determining what is privileged, courts should not
<br />"mechanically apply" the test in every case. Wolfe,
<br />839 F.2d at 774; see also Schell, 843 F.2d at 940
<br />(noting that fact /opinion distinction "should not
<br />serve as a talismanic incantation in every case ").
<br />The deliberative process privilege protects factual
<br />material that is "so inextricably intertwined with the
<br />deliberative sections of the documents that its
<br />disclosure would inevitably reveal the government's
<br />deliberations." In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 737;
<br />see Mink, 410 U.S. at 87 -91, 93 S.Ct. 827; Wolfe,
<br />839 F.2d at 774.
<br />[10] Courts have also looked to other
<br />considerations in assessing whether material is
<br />predecisional and deliberative. The function and
<br />significance of the document in the agency's
<br />decisionmaking process are relevant. See Taxation
<br />with Representation Fund, 646 F.2d<'at 678; Coastal
<br />States, 617 F.2d at 868. Documents representing
<br />the ideas and theories that go into the making of
<br />policy, which are privileged, should be distinguished
<br />from "binding agency opinions and interpretations"
<br />that are "retained and referred to as precedent" and
<br />constitute the policy itself. Sterling Drug, Inc. v.
<br />Federal Trade Comm'n, 450 F.2d 698, 708
<br />(D.C.Cir.1971); see Coastal States, 617 F.2d at
<br />859 -60.
<br />[11] Furthermore, courts examine the identity and
<br />decisionmaking authority of the office or person
<br />issuing the material. See Taxation with
<br />Representation Fund, 646 F.2d at 679; Coastal
<br />States, 617 F.2d at 868. A document from a
<br />subordinate to a superior official is more likely to be
<br />predecisional, "while a document moving in the
<br />opposite direction is more likely to contain
<br />instructions to staff explaining the reasons for a
<br />decision already made." Coastal States, 617 F.2d at
<br />868; see Taxation with Representation Fund, 646
<br />F.2d at 679 -81; Walker & Jones, The Deliberative
<br />Process Privilege, at 291 -92.
<br />[12] Finally, in addition to assessing whether the
<br />material is predecisional and deliberative, and in
<br />order to determine if disclosure of the material is
<br />likely to adversely affect the purposes of the
<br />privilege, courts inquire whether "the document is
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