Laserfiche WebLink
flows. Also, some non - kayakers may consider enough stream flow <br />to merely float the kayak reasonable. Thus, the term has no <br />plain meaning that we can apply as written. See, e.g. In re <br />2000 -2001 Dist. Grand Jury 97 P.3d at 924; Pierson 48 P.3d at <br />1218 -19. <br />In addition, the General Assembly did not define the <br />phrase, and we know of no otherwise acquired technical meaning <br />that we must consider. See Bill Boom, 961 P.2d at 470. Where a <br />statutory word or phrase, not defined by the legislature, has no <br />plain meaning or is reasonably susceptible to multiple meanings, <br />we are faced with an ambiguity and must explore extrinsic aids <br />to construction. See In re 2000 -2001 Dist. Grand Jury, 97 P.3d <br />at 924; City of Colorado Springs v. Powell 48 P.3d 561, 564 <br />(Colo. 2002). These other sources include the statute's <br />legislative history. E.g. Grant v. People 48 P.3d 543 546 <br />(Colo. 2002). Yet, in determining the legislature's intent, <br />never may we substitute our own public policy determinations for <br />8 We deem it improper to defer to the CWCB's definition of a <br />"reasonable recreation experience." See supra Part III.A. No <br />party argues for such deference, and as already discussed, the <br />CWCB's role under SB 216 is strictly limited to an initial fact - <br />finding. The Board does not possess authority to conduct agency <br />adjudications of RICD applications; that authority was granted <br />exclusively to the water court. Thus, our rules concerning <br />judicial deference of authorized agency interpretations are <br />inapplicable. See, e.g. Coffman v. Colo. Common Cause 102 <br />P.3d 999, 1005 (Colo. 2004). <br />33 <br />