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Crystal River Supreme Court Case Decision
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Crystal River Supreme Court Case Decision
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Last modified
6/30/2016 9:38:34 AM
Creation date
3/29/2010 11:43:33 AM
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Instream Flow Appropriations
Case Number
76W2720
Stream Name
Crystal River
Watershed
Roaring Fork River
Water Division
5
Instream Flow App - Doc Type
Final Decree/Stipulations
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"(6) 'Appropriation' means the diversion of a certain portion of the waters of the state <br />and the application of the same to a beneficial use." 1969 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 148- <br />21-3. <br />In 1973, four years later, the General Assembly made the modification here involved. It <br />deleted the diversion requirements from the definition of an appropriation and at the <br />same time in S.B. 97 enacted: <br />"For the benefit and enjoyment of present and future generations, 'beneficial use' shall <br />also include the appropriation by the statute of Colorado in the manner prescribed by <br />law of such minimum flows between specific points or levels for and on natural streams <br />and lakes as are required to preserve the natural environment to a reasonable degree." <br />In Colo. River Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co., 158 Colo. 331, 406 P.2d 798 (1965), <br />the Colorado River Water Conservation District played a somewhat different role. This <br />District was created by statute in 1937 and was given the power, among others, <br />"To file upon and hold for the use of the public sufficient water of any natural stream to <br />maintain a constant stream flow in the amount necessary to preserve fish, and to use <br />such water in connection with retaining ponds for the propagation of fish for the benefit <br />of the public;" Section 37-46-107(1)(j). <br />Under this power it brought the action to preserve and keep water in the stream to the <br />extent necessary for the preservation of fish life. <br />*476 This court affirmed the dismissal of the District's claims. The court considered this <br />as an attempted appropriation of "a minimum flow of water . . . for piscatorial purposes <br />without diversion." The opinion continues. <br />"By the enactment of (the statutory power quoted above) the legislature did not intend <br />to bring about such an extreme departure from well established doctrine, and we hold <br />that no such departure was brought about by said statute." <br />Without at this juncture commenting upon the subject of "minimum flow," it is obvious <br />that the General Assembly in the enactment of S.B. 97 certainly did intend to have <br />appropriations for piscatorial purposes without diversion. <br />We hold that under S.B. 97 the Colorado Water Board can make an in-stream <br />appropriation without diversion in the conventional sense. We wish to emphasize that we <br />are not hereby causing any erosion of the many opinions of this court, some of which <br />are cited above, holding that a diversion is an essential element of the water <br />appropriations involved in those cases. The many cases are distinguishable. Several <br />really had no issue as to diversion. Others involved (1) a diversion (proposed or actual), <br />(2) a beneficial use (involved or contemplated) clearly requiring a diversion, (3) <br />situations in which the evidence and measurement of an appropriative intent could be <br />predicated upon only the capacity to divert, (4) circumstances where there could not be <br />a bona fide appropriation without a physical diversion, or (5) matters in which a lack of <br />diversion violated the principle of maximum utilization enunciated in Fellhauer v. People, <br />167 Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986 (1968), and Colorado Springs v. Bender, 148 Colo. 458, <br />366 P.2d 552 (1961). <br />Colo. Water Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co., supra, involved a situation which this <br />court found to be an appropriation of Minimum flow of water and, consequently, a <br />forbidden riparian right. Irrespective of **575 how the court as presently constituted <br />might decide this issue, the opinion as there written is clearly distinguishable from the <br />statute and claims here under consideration. <br />The crucial consideration is that this court has never decided a case such as this on a <br />constitutional basis. We overrule nothing in now holding that S.B. 97 is not <br />unconstitutional in this respect. <br />II <br />[2] The last sentence of Senate Bill 97 reads: <br />"Nothing in this article shall . . . deprive the people of the state of Colorado of the <br />beneficial use of those waters available by law and interstate compact." <br />The Districts contend that the provision mentioning "waters available by law" means that <br /> <br />
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