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appropriation. The sole time it appears as to water is in Colo.Const. Art. XVI, s 6: "The
<br />right to divert the unappropriated waters of *474 any natural stream to beneficial uses
<br />shall never be denied." The reason and thrust for this provision was to negate any
<br />thought that Colorado would follow the riparian doctrine in the acquisition and use of
<br />water. In 1883, early in the history of this state, this court in Thomas v. Guiraud, 6 Colo.
<br />530, rejected the argument that Guiraud's appropriation was invalid because he had
<br />constructed no ditches. Less than three years later in Larimer Co. v. Luthe, 8 Colo. 614,
<br />9 P. 794 (1886), we find this court saying:
<br />"The maxim, Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, is here invoked. It is claimed that
<br />when the constitution recognizes the right to appropriate water by diversion, it excludes
<br />the appropriation thereof in any other manner. Further, that the word 'divert' means to
<br />take or carry it away from the bed or channel of the stream; that therefore respondent's
<br />act of utilizing a natural reservoir in the bed of the stream, and thus storing surplus
<br />water for future use, not being a diversion in the sense of the constitutional provision
<br />cited, is in conflict therewith.
<br />"We are not prepared to concede the correctness of counsel's position. It is our opinion
<br />that the above is not the most natural and reasonable view to adopt concerning the
<br />meaning of the constitution. The word 'divert' must be interpreted in connection with the
<br />word 'appropriation,' and with other language used in the remaining sections of that
<br />instrument referring to the subject of irrigation. We think there may be a constitutional
<br />appropriation of water without its being at the instant taken from the bed of the stream.
<br />This court has held that 'the true test of the appropriation of water is the successful
<br />application thereof to the beneficial use designated, and the method of distributing or
<br />carrying the same, or making such application, is immaterial.' Thomas v. Guiraud, 6
<br />Colo. 530." (Emphasis added)
<br />Many of the early settlers in this region came from places in the east and Europe where
<br />the use of water was controlled by the owners of the land through which the stream ran.
<br />In our arid area, there could be little agriculture or other development upon the non-
<br />riparian lands absent a doctrine permitting transportation to them of water from the
<br />streams. This was a prime necessity for this new country, and the right so to develop
<br />was assured and guaranteed by this "right to divert" provision of our constitution. Coffin
<br />v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
<br />Idaho has a similar constitutional provision. Its supreme court has held "that our
<br />constitution does not require actual physical diversion." State Dept. of Parks v. Dept. of
<br />Water Admin., 96 Idaho 440, 530 P.2d 924 (1974). The Idaho court there cited Genoa
<br />v. Westfall, 141 Colo. 533, 349 P.2d 370 (1960).
<br />Four years following the adoption of our constitution, the General Assembly enacted the
<br />"Meadow Act," which still remains on our statute books. Section 37-86-113, C.R.S.1973.
<br />This act permits a valid *475 appropriation without a headgate or ditch of natural
<br />overflow waters with the right to construct a ditch for the taking of such water with the
<br />same priority when the stream subsides. It is apparent that members of the General
<br />Assembly, acting so shortly after the adoption of the constitution, did not agree that it
<br />Est exclusio alterius. Rights acquired under the "Meadow Act" were upheld in Humphreys
<br />Tunnel Co. v. Frank, 46 Colo. 524, 105 P. 1093 (1909) and Broad Run Inv. Co. v. Deuel
<br />Co., 47 Colo. 573, 108 P. 755 (1910).
<br />In 1886 this court considered the question of whether storing surplus water in a natural
<br />reservoir in the bed of a stream was adequate for an appropriation. Larimer Co.
<br />Reservoir Co. v. Luthe, supra. It was argued that, when the constitution recognized the
<br />right to appropriate water by diversion, it excluded appropriation by any **574 other
<br />means; and further that the word "divert" meant to carry the water Away from the bed
<br />or channel of the stream. The court rejected both of these arguments in upholding a
<br />valid appropriation.
<br />In 1969 the first statutory requirement of diversion came into being:
<br />"(5) 'Diversion' or 'divert' means removing water from its natural course or location, or
<br />controlling water in its natural course or location, by means of a ditch, canal, flume,
<br />reservoir, bypass, pipeline, conduit, well, pump, or other structure or device.
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