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<br />Special Master correctly (1) dismissed Kansas' claim that a violation of the <br />operating principles for the Trinidad Project constituted a violation of the <br />Compact, since Kansas had failed to demonstrate that the Trinidad operations <br />caused a material depletion within the meaning of Article IV-D; and (2) found <br />that Kansas failed to prove that operation of Colorado's Winter Water Storage <br />Program resulted in material depletions of usable flows in violation of Article <br />IV-D. Overruling Colorado's exceptions, the Supreme Court holds that the <br />Special Master correctly (1) concluded that the defense of laches should not <br />bar Kansas' claim that increases in post-Compact groundwater well pumping <br />in Colorado have caused a significant decline in the Arkansas River's surface <br />flow in violation of Article IV-D, since the vague and conflicting evidence <br />available to Kansas defeats Colorado's claim of inexcusable delay; (2) <br />determined that the highest annual amount of groundwater shown to have <br />been pumped during the negotiations of the Compact is the amount of post- <br />Compact well pumping that should be allowed; (3) concluded that the 1980 <br />Operating Plan for John Martin Reservoir was "separately bargained for" and <br />should not offset depletions caused by post-Compact well pumping in <br />Colorado; and (4) concluded that, regardless of what burden of proof applies, <br />post-Compact pumping in Colorado had caused material depletions of the <br />usable Stateline flows of the Arkansas River in violation of the Compact. <br /> <br />Douglas County v. Babbitt, 9th Cir., 48 F.3d 1495. The issue in this case <br />is whether, as the district court held, the Secretary of the Interior must <br />comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in designating <br />critical habitat pursuant to the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Affirming the <br />decision of the district court on standing, the Ninth Circuit holds that the <br />County meets all of the strict procedural standing requirements in Lujan v. <br />Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (1992): The County has a procedural <br />right, as well as a concrete interest that could be harmed by the critical <br />habitat designation, and that interest is within the zone of interests protected <br />by NEPA. The Ninth Circuit reverses the decision of the lower court on the <br />merits, holding that NEPA does not apply to the Secretary of the Interior's <br />decision to designate critical habitat for an endangered or threatened species <br />under the ESA because (1) Congress intended that the ESA critical habitat <br />procedures displace the NEPA requirements, (2) NEPA does not apply to <br />actions that do not change the physical environment, and (3) applying NEPA <br />to the ESA would not further the purposes of either statute. <br /> <br />3. Legislation <br /> <br />In the First Session of the 104th Congress (without regard to the water <br />year), Congress enacted the following statutes that are important to the <br />Upper Colorado River Basin States: <br /> <br />31 <br />