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Inlures wildlife" (emphasis added). Reversing the decision of the D. C. Circuit, the Court held that when Congress enacted the ESA. it gave the Secretary broad administrative and interpretive power, and the proper interpretation of a term such as "harm" involves a "complex policy choice" better left to the Secretary. The Court concludes that the Secretary reasonably construed the intent of Congress when he defined "harm" in this regulation. The Court's conclusion is based on its finding that the text of the ESA provides three reasons for deciding that the Secretary's interpretation is reasonable: (1) an ordinary understanding of the word "harm" supports it, since the dictionary definition neither includes the word "directly" nor in any way suggests that only direct or willful action that leads to injury constitutes "harm"; (2) the broad purpose of the ESA "to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost" (TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978)) supports the Secretary's decision to extend protection against activities that cause the precise harms Congress enacted the ESA to avoid; and (3) the fact that Congress authorized the Secretary in 1982 to issue permits for takings that g9(a)(1 )(B) would otherwise prohibit, "if such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity, n 16 U.S.C. 9 1539(a)( 1 )(B), "strongly suggests" that Congress understood g9(a)(1 )(B) to prohibit indirect as well as deliberate takings. The Court found support for its conclusion in the legislative history of the ESA as well, finding that while the Committee Reports accompanying the bills that became the ESA do not specifically discuss the meaning of "harm," they "make clear that Congress intended 'take' to apply broadly to cover indirect as well as purposeful actions." The Court recognizes that in the elaboration and enforcement of the ESA, the Secretary and the people who must comply with the law will confront "difficult questions of proximity and degree," but the Court states that these questions must be addressed "through case-by- case resolution and adjudication." Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515 U.S. _, 132 L.Ed.2d 1, 115 S.Ct. A 1945 Supreme Court decree allocated the water of the North Platte River among users in Wyoming, Nebraska and Colorado. Nebraska brought the matter before the Court again by petition in 1986, and the Court appointed a Special Master to conduct the proceedings. The Master has filed his Third Interim Report, on Motions to Amend Pleadings, and made recommendations for rulings on requests for leave to amend filed by Nebraska and Wyoming. Before the Court at this time are the parties' exceptions to the Master's report, all of which the Court overrules. The Court overrules Wyoming's first amended counterclaim, which alleges that Nebraska has "circumvented and violated the equitable apportionment by demanding natural flow water for diversion by irrigation canals at and above Tri-State Dam in excess of the beneficial use requirements of the Nebraska lands entitled to water from those canals under the Decree," holding that Wyoming is really calling for a 29