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implies. To work, a market requires both a clearly defined good or service, and a sufficient quantity of this good or surplus to interest some critical mass of traders. The FWS' delineation of critical habitat satisfies the first market requirement, but by definition, endangered, and perhaps threatened status, implies that no further loss of habitat is acceptable if the species' chances for survival and recovery are to be maximized. Because a large number of species have been listed at population levels far too small to assure long-term viability, the opportunity has probably been missed to use habitat development rights as a tool for endangered species conservation. However, should the ESA take on a more aggressive and proactive effort to conserve biodiversity overall, as through ecosystem management, free- market approaches may prove effective in preventing future endangerment. The following proposal sketches the framework for a program of tradeable devel- opmentrights. The long-range goal would be to establish a tradeable permit program that targets habitats for candidate species and overall biodiversity. A proper application of marketable development rights for these habitats could ensure that they are used wisely and efficiently, with the result being that candi- date species do not become endangered species, and that an effective tool is created that will help us keep ahead of the endangerment curve. Proo~al 7 - Creation of a Market for Development Rights on Important Biological Habitat Description: As with mineral rights, water rights, easements, and tradeable pollution permits, development rights on private property that supports important biological habitat can be disaggregated from the original land base and traded freely on the open market. In this instance, owners of land providing habitat would be allowed to trade or sell rights to development. Both development and non-development interests would be eligible to buy these development rights. To implement this type of system, the FWS would have to make the initial alloca- tion of rights by determining how much of the particular habitats for candidate species and other qualifying ecosystems would be eligible for development, and then by distributing those rights among existing private land owners on a propor- tional basis. For example, if the FWS determined that 15 percent of Habitat A was eligible for development, each landowner of Habitat A would be authorized to develop up to 15 percent of the land they own on Habitat A. The FWS deter- minations on the amount of habitat eligible for development would be based on sound biological and ecological data on the amount of habitat required to sustain and maintain candidate species and overall biodiversity. Stipulations: The initial FWS determination of how much of each habitat type would be eligible for development would be firm, unless new habitat acreages were created. Those parties seeking to develop more of their land than for which they hold development rights would be obligated to obtain additional rights from other parties. For example, if Developer A's property contains 40 acres of a 13