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Initial Contacts with the Disputing Parties 59 <br />case. If parties can mobilize power so that they are informed <br />and so that the other side knows that they are dealing with a <br />prepared adversary, the power may never need to be exercised, <br />and the mediator may be able to intervene before there is a <br />crisis. Early entry in this case may prevent unnecessary damage <br />to either of the disputing parties. <br />On the other hand, if the parties have unequal power, <br />need a confrontation to mobilize resources, or must test each <br />other's strength before bargaining in good faith can begin, medi- <br />ators are advised to delay entry. This may enable the parties to <br />test and balance their power and may place them in a position <br />to bargain from a position of strength. <br />The argument for a period to vent emotions is also not <br />contested by early-entry proponents. They do, however, main- <br />tain that unstructured and prolonged venting, which may occur <br />if the mediator delays entry, may result in hostile or unproduc- <br />tive behavior that causes unnecessary psychological barriers. <br />The final argument, which relates to the "ripeness" of a dispute <br />for settlement, is an extremely important strategic issue con- <br />cerned directly with the timing of intervention. Numerous <br />mediators and negotiators have observed that disputes go <br />through specific cycles and that resolution of issues in disputes <br />often cannot occur until disputants have performed ritual acts <br />(Douglas, 1962). Mediator entry too early in a dispute, it is <br />claimed, damages this developmental cycle. <br />Late-entry proponents argue that parties are not psycho- <br />logically or strategically prepared to use an intervenor's services <br />until they have reached an impasse and recognize that they can- <br />not reach a settlement without thixd-party assistance (Perez, <br />1959, p. 717). <br />The safest rule postulates that a mediator <br />should not enter a negotiation until there is a bona <br />fide deadlock. The reason is self-evident. A prema- <br />ture intervention by the mediator relieves the par- <br />ties of the pressure under which they are working. <br />The reciprocal pressure is the basic force that keeps <br />the parties moving through proposals and counter- <br />