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UCREFRP
UCREFRP Catalog Number
8125
Author
Moore, C. W.
Title
Editor
USFW Year
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USFW - Doc Type
1986
Copyright Material
YES
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58 The Mediation Process <br />or imposed. Thexefore, they believe that disputants should <br />have adequate time to mobilize their power before starting <br />negotiations or engaging a mediator's services. Examples of mo- <br />bilization of resources might include visiting a lawyer and ob- <br />taining advice on the strength of a legal case, conducting research <br />necessary for informed negotiations, mobilizing a community <br />group to protest a particular policy, filing a case in court, or <br />planning a strike. <br />Early-entry adherents generally do not disagree with <br />those advocating late entry about the needs of parties to mobi- <br />lize and, whenever possible, equalize power. Failure to gather <br />the necessary data before negotiations is tantamount to playing <br />a game of poker without looking at the cards. Failure to assess <br />legal power or, when appropriate, extralegal action before nego- <br />tiations can cause one party to be taken advantage of by an- <br />other. <br />Advocates of early entry diverge from their colleagues <br />who advocate late entry on the question of demonstrating coer- <br />cive power. They argue that mobilization and exercise of co- <br />ercion should be separated. Advocates of early entry point to <br />experimental research (Rubin and Brown, 1975 demonstrating <br />that the exercise of coercive power, although it may promote <br />negotiations, does not necessarily promote cooperative behav- <br />ior. This finding seems to be corroborated by research on out- <br />comes of actual negotiations. Pearson (1984), for example, <br />found that couples in divorce settlement mediation who had <br />used coercive court mechanisms to obtain temporary orders had <br />a lower rate of settlement than those who had not used legal <br />coercion before settlement negotiations. <br />Late-entry advocates counter with valid case examples in <br />which the exercise of force-legal suits, strikes, or demonstra- <br />tions-has been necessary to demonstrate a party's power and, <br />in some cases, to force an opponent to negotiate. Last-minute <br />pressure has clearly inclined parties toward agreement and has <br />motivated them to request a mediator's assistance. <br />Mediators who look for easy answers regarding questions <br />of power and timing of the impartial party's entry will probably <br />find none. The best answer is that these factors depend on the <br />
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