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This confusion was due to uncertainty over how to <br />handle the resolution of technical questions and <br />how to move forward. The parties looked to the <br />FERC for leadership but found little, and the <br />direction provided by the applicant did not seem to <br />lead to timely results. Confusion did not arise <br />from disputes over which studies to conduct. <br />Rather, after completing the studies the parties still <br />did not agree on how to interpret the results. <br />The post-license phase was marked by <br />studies designed to meet license requirements and <br />agreements on several outstanding issues. But the <br />issue of flow release in the Pit'3 bypass reach had <br />not been resolved. After the flow studies were <br />completed the parties could not agree whether the <br />flows were established to promote trout habitat or <br />eagle foraging on Sacramento Sucker. Even within <br />the internal deliberations of one of the parties there <br />was no agreement about this question. Moreover, <br />although the parties did agree that eagle foraging <br />was one important factor, they could not agree how <br />much use by eagles constituted foraging: Did one <br />eagle taking one fish constitute foraging or did <br />foraging require a group of eagles making regular <br />use of the reach? <br />We rated the negotiation as minimally <br />successful. Agreement was not reached on flows <br />and the FERC order was contested. <br />Implementation was included on those issues agreed <br />to; monitoring was a part of FERC license. All <br />parties reported a willingness to negotiate again. <br />Success scores range from 1-7. <br />DISCUSSION <br />Of the six projects, we evaluated two as <br />fully successful (Eastman Falls and Koma <br />Kulshan), and four as minimally successful <br />(Oswegatchie, Cataract, Ashton-St. Anthony, and <br />Pit 3, 4, 5). The two successful cases were the <br />ones in which technical clarity was most evident <br />(Table 3). Although two consultations were judged <br />to be successful each displayed unique <br />distinguishing features. In Eastman Falls the key <br />feature was the earlier negotiation of a <br />comprehensive plan covering fish passage <br />requirements for the entire river. Mitigation steps <br />required of the Eastman Falls project proponent <br />were understood in advance and the consultation <br />was a matter of conforming to the plan. Questions <br />did arise about the responsibilities of individuals <br />representing some of the parties to the consultation <br />because those representatives had not been a part of <br />the negotiations over the comprehensive plan. <br />However, these questions did not impinge upon the <br />technical clarity of the issues under negotiation. <br />In Koma Kulshan the issues were <br />streamflow, sedimentation, and public access. <br />Unlike Eastman Falls, there was no previous <br />agreement on these issues. The parties had to <br />decide what the problems were, determine <br />appropriate studies to evaluate alternatives, and <br />design a solution. All of this required considerable <br />time. This was the one case we studied for which <br />no license had yet been issued. Because the project <br />was not in place the parties had the luxury of time <br />to develop a solution. Although the parties were <br />interested in completing the consultation, several <br />non-technical issues delayed the process. The delay <br />allowed time to develop trust-based working <br />relationships. Finally, the parties agreed that the <br />environmental effects of the project would be <br />minor. <br />The feature that sets these negotiations <br />apart from those that were less successful is that <br />the parties shared an understanding of the technical <br />issues. In both cases this shared understanding <br />arose from a long negotiation; albeit in the Eastman <br />Falls instance that negotiation occurred in a <br />separate forum. In each case the technical issues <br />were straightforward and there was no real question <br />about whether or not the project should be licensed <br />(although this was not clear at the beginning of the <br />Koma Kulshan consultation). <br />The parties in both consultations were able <br />to resolve (Koma Kulshan) or already had resolved <br />(Eastman Falls) the technical questions related to <br />the heart of the negotiation: What is the extent of <br />adverse environmental effects? That is to say, they <br />resolved the value or ethical questions about the <br />project. Simon (1976) observed that every decision <br />contains both fact and value elements. Factual <br />propositions are those things that can be objectively <br />tested, while values are statements of what ought to <br />be. Values are ethical propositions that "cannot be <br />described as correct or incorrect" (Simon 1976:50). <br />One of the most difficult tasks in the consultations <br />we studied was for the parties to arrive at some <br />ethical premise that would guide their negotiations. <br />In the successful negotiations the parties were either <br />given or developed the premise that it was suitable <br />that the license be granted. Reaching this