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<br />policies, through a more limited set of entities. At that time, <br /> <br /> <br />the Colorado Water Conservation Board, the conservation and con- <br /> <br /> <br />servancy districts, and major project developers such as the <br /> <br /> <br />Denver Water Board were the primary generators of state water <br /> <br />policy. <br /> <br />First, Colorado sought to preserve to the state as much water <br /> <br />as possible for appropriation by its citizens. This was <br /> <br />accomplished primarily through U. S. Supreme Court litigation and <br /> <br />the negotiation and implementation of interstate compacts. <br /> <br />Second, the state actively encouraged traditional water <br /> <br />storage project development. The state pursued the construction <br /> <br />of federal reclamation projects, and state water policy agencies <br /> <br />supported individual project development. The Colorado Supreme <br /> <br />Court responded in a similar manner. The court adopted the <br /> <br />"great and growing cities doctrine", and generally made it easy <br /> <br />to appropriate and keep alive conditional water rights for large <br /> <br />but then-unneeded water projects. <br /> <br />These two basic goals remained valid mostly because the state <br /> <br />did not have to consider raising its own capital for project <br /> <br />development. In cases where local support was apparent but <br /> <br />financing was not, the state was pleased to lend political <br /> <br />assistance toward obtaining cheap financing from the federal <br /> <br />bankroll. Therefore, th is state policy could be entirely based <br /> <br />on Colorado I s decentral ized, entrepreneural system. For those <br /> <br />local entities with the financial ability to develop their own <br /> <br />systems--such as Denver, Colorado Springs, and Aurora--the state <br /> <br />-4- <br />