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<br />are wasteful and inefficient. On the other hand, using the same criterion, <br />individual irrigators, residential water customers, and commercial and <br />industrial users are very likely to be making appropriate water use decisions. <br />The apparent contradictions between system allocation decisions and individual <br />user behavior is the residual of a paradox of overvaluing (but sometimes <br />underpricing) water in certain applications while ignoring its value <br />completely in others. <br /> <br />Modest Suggestions Concerning Colorado's Water Policy <br /> <br />Colorado has an abundance of water, but other natural resources have had <br />a more profound influence on the region's development. Furthermore, if one <br />had to identify a single component of infrastructure investment that has <br />facilitated development, it would be transportation systems, not water supply. <br /> <br />Nonetheless, Colorado's use of its water resources in the future is <br />likely to become more important. Although individual users, whether in cities <br />or in rural areas, are probably making efficient use of the resource, at the <br />system level, the vast differences in the relative value of water and the <br />often ignored instream value suggest that inefficiencies abound. Perhaps <br />there is a place for the State in helping make better use of this important <br />resource. <br /> <br />The primary role of the State, when dealing with water or any other issue <br />involving a public good, is to ensure that the interests of all its citizens <br />are protect.ed, To the extent that. it facilitates and encourages the <br />development of its natural l'esources, it has the responsibility to see that <br />t.hey are used effici ent] y (:i. e., t.hat there are not alternat i ves with greater <br />benefits or lower costs) and to protect against inequi table l'edistributions of <br />citizens' wealth, income, and assets. The courts protect equity, but <br />sometimes the transaction costs are high. The State's remaining institutions <br />are either passive or reactive, The one other "institution" operating in the <br />State---the market for water rights---is influenced by considerations for <br />efficiency, but often costly externalities escape detection and, at the <br />moment, entry is t'estricted. These gaps and shortcomings suggest that there <br />may be a greater role for the State to play. To find its niche and define its <br />role, the State might take advantage of one of the characteristics of the <br />mature phase of its water economy--ouser interdependencies and system links. <br /> <br />Two examples come immediately to mind: a partnership between agricultural <br />and municipal interests; and contractual arrangements between the State of <br />Colorado and downstream water users within the Colorado River basin. Both <br />would make it possible for the State to use its water resources more <br />efficiently and, at the same time, positively affect the agricultural economy <br />and recognize the value of instream flows. <br /> <br />Given the existing physical links between municipal and agricultural <br />water supply systems, the potential for enhancing these links, and the <br />relative value of water in municipal and agricultural uses, some movement of <br />water from irrigation to households and industries is inevitable. The State <br />can oversee this transition in such a way as to foster the interests of all <br />its citizens. In addition, to the extent that transfers from agricultural to <br /> <br />- 14 - <br />