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<br />. <br /> <br />page 2 <br /> <br />promises of benefits. As Larry's case studies show, weare not very good <br />at decision making involving the allocation of harms. The resource is <br />perceived by many to be fully utilized. Some feel the resource base is <br />shrinking. Many of those interested in. the outcome of reallocation <br />decisions believe with justification that if they lose out now, there is <br />simply no chance of their making up that loss sometime in the future. Both <br />allocation of harms and perceptions of resource scarcity make for very <br />contentious decision making. <br /> <br />3. The Water Resource As ^ Commons ---- By tradition and in the <br />public interest, water has been treated differently than other resources. <br />Water has been treated as a commons available for free or at a subsidized <br />cost for as long as it lasts. This seemed reasonable at first given the <br />seeming abundance of water and water's cultural significance. Societal <br />organization was premised on this management of the water resource. In <br />Larry's cases the communities reflect this in how they respond to the <br />prospect of losing their water. <br />It is in the individual interest to acquire and use as much of the <br />common resource as possible as fast as possible. If you don't, others will <br />and you lose. This leads to the classic tragedy of the commons so well <br />described by Garret Hardin in his famous essay. The tragedy is the loss of <br />the common resource through. overuse. Hardin's solution was mutual <br />coercion, mutually agreed upon, to manage the resource. <br /> <br />4. Some Limits to Political Resource Management ----Mutual coercion <br />for water resources allocation has generally been through political- <br />legislative-regulatory decision making. There are inherent limitations <br />and failures of markets. There are similar fundamental limitations and <br />faHures inherent i.n' t.he poUt.teal decision making processes. These <br />include limits on knowledge and comprehension; on rational analys\s, and on <br />implementation and also failures in oversight. <br /> <br />5. Megaproblems ---- Dealing with water resource problems appears to <br />involve dealing with "megaproblems". These are nests of large, poorly <br />understood, interconnected problems arising from the interaction of <br />technology, culture, and resource limitations. They involve lots of <br />diverse interests or players. They defy rational, technical, and political <br />solution. Also, the intensity of self-interested competition for the water <br />resources makes finding solutions more difficult and results in unintended <br />and unanticipated consequences adding yet more uncertainty to the context. <br /> <br />6. Summary ---- These contextual features, and a few others, create <br />difficulty in anticipatory recognition and response to the public interest. <br />Reactive recognition is not so difficult when it is in the "public <br />interest" to later clean up a mess. Given these features, I support <br />greater emphasis upon market as opposed to political reallocation of water <br />resources - but with cautions. <br /> <br />B . Communi t y Responses <br /> <br />1. Who Participates In The Market ---- At present the non impairment <br />rule for evaluating market transfers is focused upon existing water rights. <br />Many significant, but newer, water users are unable to obtain water rights. <br />