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<br />B. <br /> <br />Federal Reaulatorv Authoritv <br /> <br />1. Confusion with the Concept of Naviaabilitv for <br />Title <br /> <br />In the early cases, the classification of waters <br /> <br />as navigable for title was used as a measure of <br /> <br />the federal government's regulatory authority <br /> <br />under the Commerce Clause. The Court in Gibbons <br /> <br />v. Qaden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), interpreted <br />the Commerce Clause as "comprehending navigation <br /> <br />within the limits of every state." Under the <br /> <br />federal commerce power, navigable waters were <br /> <br />described as "the public property of the nation, <br /> <br />and subject to all direct legislation by <br />Congress." Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 <br /> <br />Wall.) 713, 724-25 (1865). During the twentieth <br /> <br />century, and especially after 1937, the reach of <br /> <br />Congress's power under the Commerce Clause <br /> <br />expanded dramatically. ~,~, NLRB v. Jones <br /> <br />and Lauahlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); <br />Katzenbach v. McCluna, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). <br /> <br />Unfortunately, widespread confusion developed <br /> <br />between the concept of navigability for title and <br />Congress's legislative authority, because some <br /> <br />cases had treated the two synonYmously, ~, ~, <br /> <br />Gilman v. Philadelphia, supra, and because several <br /> <br />federal- statutes articulated CQngress's regulatory <br /> <br />authority in terms of "navigable waters," ~, <br /> <br />~, United States v. Appalachian Electric Power <br /> <br />6 <br /> <br />e <br /> <br />e) <br /> <br />e) <br />