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<br />
<br />THE
<br />CHANGING
<br />ROLE OF TH E
<br />SECRETARY ON
<br />THE COLORADO
<br />RIVER
<br />
<br />JOSEPH SAX, FORMER COUNSELOR TO
<br />THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,
<br />CUNTON ADMINISTRATION
<br />
<br />I'm in the unenviable position, as contrasted with
<br />at least two of my colleagues on the panel, in that
<br />memories of the current administration's Colorado
<br />River policy have not dimmed. Unfortunately, as I
<br />look around, I see a number of the principals - or
<br />victims as they may view themselves - of that policy.
<br />So it's a little difficult to know exactly what to say.
<br />I thought it might be of some interest to give you
<br />a sense from my perspective of how the current
<br />Secretary's posture toward Colorado River issues
<br />developed. Every Secretary, among the myriad issues
<br />presented with which he has to deal, always affords
<br />some issues particularly high priority, issues that are
<br />thought to be of special importance. That certainly,
<br />in my observation, has been the case with Secretary
<br />Babbitt.
<br />One question is how these Colorado River issues,
<br />and I'm thinking particularly of the Lower Colorado,
<br />moved up on the scale. Among water issues one could
<br />identify, I'm not sure what the right number is,
<br />certainly a handful have been [Babbitt's] special
<br />priorities, among them the Platte, the Bay-Delta, the
<br />Everglades and the Colo-
<br />rado River.
<br />My own sense is that
<br />there was some consider-
<br />able hesitation about
<br />making these current
<br />negotiations over the
<br />Colorado River a high
<br />priority item, even though
<br />for the first time, the Lower
<br />Basin beginning in 1996,
<br />was using its full seven and
<br />a half million acre foot
<br />share. It was clear that in
<br />not too many years, Nevada
<br />wouLd get to the point
<br />where it would exceed its limited entitlement. I think
<br />the conventional view is, "We've reached a crisis:
<br />something had to be done," but I would suggest to
<br />you that's not necessarily the case. I believe it would
<br />have been possible to just let these Colorado River
<br />issues limp along and pass them on to the next
<br />administration, or the next, by at least two devices.
<br />One, just to rely on surpluses and some management
<br />of surplus policy so that you could sort of keep things
<br />going for a considerable period of time. Obviously
<br />nobody knows exactly how long. And/or, alterna-
<br />tively, since the problem was particularly focused in
<br />terms of quantity on the Met's [MWD of Southern
<br />
<br />The Secretary
<br />
<br />
<br />wanted to show
<br />
<br />that it was
<br />
<br />possible to make
<br />
<br />the Endangered
<br />Species Act work.
<br />
<br />SYMPOSIUM
<br />PROCEEDINGS
<br />SEPTEMBER 1999
<br />
<br />~
<br />
<br />- Joseph Sax
<br />
<br />California] excess diversion, to allow litigation to go
<br />forward between the Met and the Imperial Irrigation
<br />District over questions of waste.
<br />It was an important and, I think, significant fact
<br />that Secretary Babbitt decided that was not the way
<br />to go; that this was an important issue;. that it needed
<br />to be and ought to be resolved; and that this was
<br />something that he, as Secretary, could leave behind as
<br />one of his important accomplishments. So he made
<br />the decision to put substantial resources, I don't mean
<br />in dollars, but in terms of the human energy of the
<br />Department, into trying to get the problem resolved.
<br />He had, I think, a clear notion about what ultimately
<br />a sensible resolution of those problems would be and
<br />why getting to some such resolution would be an
<br />important legacy to leave behind.
<br />It's nothing very complicated, nothing very
<br />obscure. It is simply that, in a situation like this-
<br />which is a common situation in the arid West where,
<br />in one form or another, demand is outrunning
<br />existing supplies - you've simply got to put into place
<br />some mechanism whereby water can be reallocated so
<br />that you can meet demand on an acceptable basis
<br />with the existing supply. People usually use terms like
<br />marketing, some means of getting markets going.
<br />And, of course, there are various kinds of potential
<br />markets in the Colorado River on a sort of rising scale
<br />of controversy, intrastate markets, interstate within
<br />the Lower Basin markets, inter-basin markets. Only
<br />the first two of those in some form have been a part
<br />of Secretary Babbitt's policy.
<br />Now, you would think that getting some sort of
<br />market underway wouldn't be all that complicated.
<br />To an outside observer, it appears you couldn't have a
<br />more ideal situation: you have people that have lots
<br />of water that they're using which has relatively low
<br />value in economic terms and people who need water,
<br />for whom the water has a vastly higher value in
<br />economic terms. That usually opens the way to
<br />relatively easy voluntary transactions, that is, agricul-
<br />tural to urban water transfers.
<br />But the fact of the matter is, and this is a matter
<br />that made it very difficult to take this on as a high
<br />priority, there were a lot of festering problems;
<br />problems that had lain relatively dormant for a very
<br />long time, almost anyone of which, maybe all of
<br />which, were potentially explosive. These are familiar
<br />to all of you. You had the controversy between the
<br />Imperial Irrigation District and the Coachella Valley
<br />District based on their agreement, going back to
<br />1934, that controversy had been ongoing for many
<br />decades. You had the controversy about whether the
<br />Imperial Irrigation District was wasting water. You
<br />had the internal Metropolitan controversy between
<br />San Diego and other Metropolitan member agencies.
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