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situation can always be expected, but since these problems caused delays in eventual operations and diversions from the river, attention and funds were required. The steel rings on the siphons were defec- tive and had to be repaired. Fourth, the Yuma Desalting Plant was being completed at great cost in order to comply with the Mexican Treaty, Order 272, and the Colorado River Salinity Act. But after completing the plant, the operational costs of about $30 million a year, caused the plant to be, what I call "mothballed," but I am told that it's just "deferred in its operation." Alterna- tives are presently being used. Fifth, Indianwater right settlements were a major problem. Secretary Lujan was a proponent of trying to arrive at such settlements. But even if there were agreements, wet water had to be obtained. A difficult matter. Look at the San Luis Rey Settlement, we're still trying to find water for it. However, even though difficult, the Secretary tried and even thought that the Animas LaPlata Project would be constructed. But, 10, the Indians are still waiting. Also, PL-102- 573 contained an Indian water rights settlement as part of that title for the Central Utah Project. Sixth, as I remember, in Nevada there was a contract with an outfit called BI Industries and it was going to transfer its water to the city of Henderson and this raised some interesting problems. As you all know, a water user must have a contract with the Secretary to use Lower Colorado River water, at least that's the way I understand it. However, a policy and legal situation was raised when this transfer was proposed without Secretarial consent. After consider- able discussion, BI relented and the transfer was accomplished as it should have been and a new contract was entered into. Seventh, during this period, Commissioner Underwood - he probably will correct me - and the Bureau worked diligently on drought contingency plans, not only on the Colorado but on all rivers in the West. The Bureau spent, I'd say a couple of years, drafting these drought contingency plans. As an aside, a "purpose" of the Bureau was adopted. The Bureau's strategic plan at first was drafted to provide that all actions were to be eco- nomically feasible. After some head knocking, it provided that the Bureau's actions were to be "envi- ronmentally and economically feasible." And this purpose, I think, remains in the strategic plans of the Bureau of Reclamation. Even Dan Beard, I think, kept that purpose for the Bureau. I suppose that the strategic plan probably lays out most of the policy of the Bureau throughout the West, that the Bush Administration adopted. I think there are several new strategic plans and I would guess that there will be more strategic plans as time goes on. Eighth, there were other matters involving the Colorado River in some fashion, such as the $925 million for the completion of the Central Arizona Project and $10 million on cutting the salinity of the Salton Sea. We now have an act, I don't know what's going to happen to the Salton Sea. The passage of Public Law 102-572 in October of 1992, over Interior's and Agriculture's objections, mainly over the Central Valley provisions, was the most trouble- some legislation of this period. Some of the matters discussed previous, such as the Grand Canyon Protection Act, were involved in this massive act. Now, these matters were some of the things that I can remember. Dennis [Underwood] might have more. I would say that we didn't really have much of a definite policy except state soveteignty and, as we worked on it, the strategic plan began to set out a policy for the Bureau of Reclamation that, of course, would apply to the Colorado River. We did work and we did have cooperation with most of the states and the Western states Governors Association. We had a lot of conversations on the Central Utah Project. We had misgivings because of the cost of it. That's what you have to remember, all during our administration the budget was going down and I think it's still going this way. I think most of the time we took a pragmatic approach. There were so many problems that you had to address each problem as it came up. You did the best you could. I think that Dennis had a tough time. First, he had to come down and see me every day or two, which I'm sure caused him a lot of grief. I don't think Dennis really believed much in policy, I think he believed more in getting the job done. I think it was a pretty successful time under very trying situations because the drought situation all over the West was very severe. I don't believe that politics played too much of a role in it. Of course, politics always play some role, but we listened to the states, we tried to do what we could. We had to work with a Democratic Congress. That makes it difficult for any administration because, no matter what you have, you've got to get money to do it and you've got a lot of different ideas. Whether we played it in the Interior Department or not, politics are played in Congress, so that's the way it goes. As far as Mexico was concerned, we were always interested in the salinity problems and we paid attention to the Colorado River Salinity Act. I suppose a lot of the time was spent on the Yuma Desalting Plant which, at least for the present, has gone for naught. That is all I have to say about what happened during the administration under Secretary Lujan. THE CHANGING ROLE OFTHE SECRETARY ON TH E COLORADO RIVER SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS SEPTEMBER 1999 o