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Agricultural Water Users in Opposition <br />Many agricultural water users also questioned the wisdom of eutering into basin <br />discussions. Their discontent emerged soon after the 1994 pact was signed, but erupted most <br />strongly soon after launching tlie 1997 Cooperative Agreement. Opposition of agriculturalists <br />was different from that of the environmentalists in that, whereas the environmentalists were <br />divided over whether or not to be at the negotiating table, agriculture had its representatives at the <br />table. Governors of the respective states saw to that. Rejectionists in the agricultural water user <br />communities stood in opposition to what they feared their representatives would agree to do. <br />They became most vocal and disruptive in 1997-1.999 after the MOA was signed, after a <br />Governance committee and its advisory committees had been established, at least on paper. Their <br />story will be at least partly addressed in Chapters 15 (science and junk science) and 16 (land <br />habitat). Despite the presence of rejectionists in each of the camps-water user and environmental- <br />- the collaborative process was beginning to work The Babbit and Romer initiative that led to the <br />1994 agreement to talk was beginning to create a de facto coalition that could hope to provide and <br />manage resources in the critical habitat over the long run. <br />Sideboards, Milestones, and Relief'From Jeopardy <br />By March of 1995 the negotiations had produced a preliminary vision, a rough outline of <br />how a negotiated solution might look (LJ.S. Fish & Wildlife Service 1995). Referred to as the <br />"Sideboards Document" it envisioned ESA implementation in a fair and scientifically sound <br />manner, emphasized the use of collaboration in adaptive management, and a comprehensive <br />multi-species approach. It kept the; negotiators tugether, established a history, a justification for <br />talks, and a vision of a direction that negotiators could follow and share with their constituents. <br />The sideboards statement provided an essential vocabulary of concepts that would serve <br />negotiators in the years to follow, iiefining principles for expenditure of federal funds, financial <br />protocols, adaptive management, a route to the construction of a reasonable an prudent alternative <br />that would provide quantities of land and water, and stipulated some essential milestones to be <br />fulfilled, a list of issues yet to be negotiated. <br />Milestones embodied the concept of "sufficient progress" as defined and required by the <br />FWS. As a central component of adaptive management, milestones represent systematic checks <br />on progress, allow adjustment for unforeseen circumstances, and create incremental goals that <br />bring the process closer to the objective-i.e., construction of a viable reasonable and prudent <br />alternative. Milestones would be assessed year by year, state by state, and organization by <br />organization. If sufficient progress was not in evidence, the FWS could threaten to withdraw relief <br />from jeopardy, and re-open any biological opinions that had been issued. Milestones would be <br />negotiated, and employed, in the domains of water, land, research and monitoring, and program <br />governance and administration. <br />A significant concern for states and their water users centered on the possibility of not <br />fulfilling a milestone due to circumstances beyond control, and the resulting consequences of that <br />failure. For example, if budgets and market conditions would only allow acquisition of a portion <br />of required land for habitat, how quick would the FWS be to withdraw the promise of regulatory <br />certainty? Essentially, the FWS service walked a fine line between reasonable flexibility in an <br />57