Organizing for Endangered and Threatened Species Habitat Draft

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? ? ? ? ? initiated the MOA process, it seemed to this Audoban representative that energy and focus was ? being diverted from a possible success within the FERC framework. The thought was less than ? welcome that the FERC process was about to be superceded. The Audubon Society representative determined that, because of ideological and methodological differences, it would no longer be constructive for all environmentalists to work together due to deadlocks that had emerged among them. For some, then, who saw little room for compromise in the biological opinion, and who had difficulty with the idea that a new set of negotiations would replace those focused on FERC re-licensing, it was all too much. For them, it was time to walk. However, some environmentalists felt strongly enough about the merits of the process that they either never left or soon returned to the table. One element attractive to these environmentalists was that the Cooperative Agreement that was being forged at the table for signing in 1997, clearly laid down an environmentally desirable policy-no new depletions on the Platte could be made without full replacement. That alone was a compelling reason to continue with the negotiations. Another reason to stay engaged was the larger political and ecological issue of landscape-level planning, something that the FERC discussions could not deliver. Nebraska alone could not be expected to satisfy the needs of cranes without the contributions of upstream states Colorado and Wyoming that had the watersheds. None of the three states could achieve the essential habitat improvement goals alone. Scientifically and politically, basin-wide planning was critical, if species were to have habitat restored. The basin encompassed the important actors as well as the options of a large area and many different access points for change. The Platte river negotiations gave environmentalists what they needed and were not likely to get any other way-basin-wide effort. When Whooping Crane Trust and Audubon representatives suddenly stepped away from the table in the summer and fall of 1996, the Environmental Defense Fund was left at the table without its coalition partners. Its representative became concerned that the walk-out risked uiuiecessarily alienating DOI, particularly in light that agency's relatively recent efforts to assure full membership status of environmental representatives. Furthermore, the walk-out threatened to throw away a golden opportunity for basin-wide water re-regulation. Meanwhile DOI authorities maintained linkages to the walk-outs. Later, in the spring of 1997, representatives of the Whooping Crane Trust and Audubon would return. They knew that a Cooperative Agreement was being forged and would be signed by mid-1997. It was better, they calculated, to be party to the deal and help the program work. After all, they had already won no small victory. The nature of the debate had changed in the Platte basin. It was no longer about defending the old status quo. Discussion was now about how to re-organize water flows, replace any new depletions, acquire terrestrial habitat, work out program monitoring plans. It was all about species recovery. In the final analysis, environmentalists who stayed at the table had a hand in an exciting new agenda and they still had the ESA as a backstop-the DOI and the states could not sell away the environmental agenda too much if sharp-eyed environmentalists were close to the process and were always capable of exercising their litigation option. 56