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subservient to their needs. Traditional users of BLM land had no more guaranteed rights to these <br />public assets than anyone else, but many ranchers and farmers depended for much of their revenue <br />on easy unrestricted access to public BLM land as an extension of their private operations. <br />Bankers and other market forces had capitalized low cost access to these assets into the valuation <br />of their businesses (Andrews 1999). Any threat to their cheap availability would be energetically <br />resisted by farmers and ranchers who were struggling for survival in an economy that was <br />organized to extract the maximum ftom them and repay them minimally. <br />As the BLM undertook to irnplement its iricreased environmental mandate, and used its <br />authority to begin to seriously constrain access to public land and water, the agency triggered a <br />backlash among some Western public-land users who fought for continued access on the old <br />terms. Those users organized a lobbying campaign-the'Sagebrush Rebellion'-to intimidate the <br />agency and reduce, if not stop, meaningful federal intervention in their traditional local control. <br />A later smooth more sophisticated successor came to be known as the "wise-use" movement. It <br />continued the fi t for traditional uses of land and water free of significant constraint from <br />federal agencies with environmental mandates. By the early 1990's the wise-use movement <br />consisted of 600 property rights grc?ups formed under an umbrella organization called "Alliance <br />for America" (Nestor 1997). <br />When Ronald Reagan's adrninistration took office in 1981, the President began to reverse <br />much of the Carter administration's environmental advance. Reagan adopted much of the <br />sagebrush rebellion agenda and placed leaders of the movement in positions of authority. With <br />this shift, farmers, ranchers, and state water user interests were able to push back hard against the <br />biologists in the Fish and Wildlife Service who issued biological opinions that favored "varmints" <br />over people. They would attempt to build a coalition of forces that could "guY" the ESA and <br />other environmental laws governing ranching, logging, and mining, but they soon found that <br />more environmentally conscious congressmen from other regions would prevent overturning the <br />United States' new-found environrnental priorities. The subsequent George Bush administration <br />moderated the anti-environmental priorities of the early Reagan years, but honored environmental <br />priorities more by simple neglect. <br />During the course of the 1992 election, the wise-use movement divided its energies <br />between George Bush Senior and Koss Perot and thereby lost impact. William Jefferson Clinton <br />won and upon entering office appointed strong erivironmental protection advocates to positions in <br />the Department of Interior. But in 1994, in the elections of the 104'h Congress, voters-especially <br />in the West-sent to Washington anti-Clinton politicians who had no love for environmental <br />agendas. The anti-Clinton-and in part anti-environmental-backlash had given control of the <br />House of Representatives to a Republican majority for the first time in 40 years. Control of <br />important Congressional committees shifted to a group of aggressively anti-environmental <br />legislators. Over the next two years-1994-1996--conservative Republicans mounted an all-out <br />assault on the center of environme:ntal law that had been constructed in the 1960's, and 1970's. <br />This produced Congressional log jams and repeated Clinton vetoes, which sometimes all too <br />narrowly derailed mounting efforts to overturn environmental legislation including the ESA. <br />The years leading to an eventual 1994 agi-eement to negotiate water issues in the Platte <br />river basin-and the subsequent peliod of actual systematic negotiations between 1994-1997-were <br />45