<br />In support of the Federal program of solar energy
<br />development, MITRE Corporation prepared a series of
<br />studies [15] to develop experience curves and cost trends and
<br />apply them to the problem of predicting the cost of solar-
<br />related equipment, including large wind turbines. Their
<br />studies did not, in general, make allowance for improvement
<br />in product performance that would result from technological
<br />improvements during the evolution of these products. Much
<br />of the data was limited to only a few doublings of ac-
<br />cumulated production, and the cost index used differed from
<br />the value index used by the Boston Consulting Group. Their
<br />curves show general trends common to a large majority of
<br />products undergoing a cost bulge in the early to mid-1950s, an
<br />easing of costs at the end of the 1950s and into the mid-1960s,
<br />and a sharp upward inflection point at 1973.
<br />Looking at both sets of data, two influences can be seen.
<br />One is the experience effect; this is production-related and is
<br />independent of the calendar, with each product having its own
<br />rate of growth. The other is an external effect, calendar-
<br />related, that tends to affect all products in the same way at the
<br />same time. The external effect shows a lesser experience rate
<br />in the 1950s, a greater experience rate in the early and mid-
<br />1960s, and a sharp unfavorable inflection point at 1973. These
<br />trends coincide almost exactly with trends in the productivity
<br />of the private nonfarm business economy as shown in Fig. 5.
<br />The MITRE study mentioned these external factors, but did
<br />not investigate their causes beyond attributing them generally
<br />to surges in the cost of labor and energy. The report men-
<br />tioned a tendency for long-established products to exhibit
<br />flatter experience curves than those of novel products.
<br />However, if the calendar-related trend shown in Fig. 5 is
<br />removed from the experience curves of the Boston Consulting
<br />Group (14) and MITRE (15), little evidence remains of such a
<br />distinction. The portion of the cost trend related to
<br />production, the experience rate proper, continues in effect
<br />even when externalities such as changes in the nationwide
<br />productivity superimpose other cost trends of a less predic-
<br />table nature.
<br />In bringing these general considerations to bear on
<br />estimating the cost of large wind turbines, the mission
<br />analyses by General Electric [2], Kaman [3], and Lockheed [4]
<br />allowed experience effects for relatively short production
<br />runs, up to the thousandth unit (ten-thousandth in the case of
<br />Lockheed). General Electric included estimates based on 85
<br />and 90-percent experience rates, since a wide variety of their
<br />products in mass production have consistently demonstrated
<br />rates close to 85 percent over the long pull. Analyses of ex-
<br />pected experience rate made by Kaman [3] were based on the
<br />assumption that certain major components of wind machines,
<br />such as electrical elements and steel for towers, would be
<br />purchased off-the-shelf from present manufacturers at
<br />present prices and therefore would not contribute to the
<br />experience rate. Kaman arrived thereby at an estimate very
<br />close to 95 percent. This assumption may be justified so long
<br />as wind machines represent only a small fraction of the
<br />market for such off-the-shelf components, but appears
<br />questionable as it becomes economically worthwhile to
<br />redesign each component and produce it specifically for the
<br />given product line, as Ford did [13]. The numbers adduced in
<br />the analysis that follows suggest that this point would be
<br />surpassed except for the very lowest national target, and that
<br />the Kaman estimate of the experience rate may therefore be
<br />unduly low.
<br />In estimating the cost of large wind turbines, the MITRE
<br />study followed the guidance of the General Electric [2] and
<br />Kaman [3] mission analyses. It assumed that the cost of 958
<br />dollars per kW for the first "mass-produced" machine (in
<br />1976 dollars) would decrease by 35 dollars with the second
<br />machine and with each doubling thereafter until the
<br />thousandth had been built, when cost would reach 609 dollars
<br />
<br />Journal of Solar Energy Engineering
<br />
<br /> 130
<br /> /
<br /> /
<br /> 120 /
<br />;;; Trend ------y/
<br />-'
<br /><t 110 /
<br />u /
<br />(J)
<br />0 100 130
<br />~ /
<br />a: *Cytlically /
<br />0 90 /
<br />Q adjusted ^ 120
<br />t-- / /
<br /><D 60 / "
<br />!!! / .'
<br />X / ! 110
<br />w 70 /; I
<br />0
<br />~ /,/
<br /> 60 100
<br /> 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975
<br />
<br />
<br />-". .
<br />
<br />YEARS
<br />
<br />* The cyclical adjustment is based on a regression of productivity
<br />on the current and lagged unemployment rate from 1960 to 1968.
<br />Sources: Department of Labor and Council of Economic Advisers.
<br />
<br />Fig,5 Productivity in the private nonfarm business economy, from the
<br />Economic Report of the President (1978)
<br />
<br />per kW and remain constant thereafter. This substituted an
<br />assumption of fixed-dollar decline for the fixed-proportion
<br />decline of the experience law, and terminated its efficacy at a
<br />level of production two to four orders of magnitude smaller
<br />than that characteristic of the other studies cited. In this form,
<br />the MITRE projections became an input to the SPURR
<br />(System for Projecting Utilization of Renewable Resources)
<br />model used to generate estimates of relative market
<br />penetration rates for solar technologies [16]. Beyond the
<br />references cited, no justification was adduced for assuming a
<br />constant product cost after the thousandth unit, and in their
<br />search of the literature, the authors have found no other.
<br />On the basis of these considerations, it was assumed for the
<br />present calculations that an experience law would continue to
<br />characterize the cost of large wind turbines, at least in relation
<br />to other sources of energy. Experience rates of 95,90, and 85
<br />percent were selected for exploratory calculations. The 95
<br />percent rate has been characterized by Lindley [17] as con-
<br />servative and appears to be so by comparison with other
<br />authorities cited. The 85 percent rate may be described as
<br />middle-of-the-road or optimistic, depending upon what
<br />authority one chooses to accept.
<br />
<br />Performing the Calculations. Calculations were made for
<br />four different machine capacities: 0.3, 0.6, 1.2, and 2.4 MW.
<br />The experience curve was expressed in analytic form:
<br />
<br />cents/MJ =Anlog2b
<br />
<br />where A is a constant dependent on the cost of energy from a
<br />particular machine, n is the ordinal number of that machine in
<br />the production run, and b is the experience rate expressed as
<br />the cost decrease per doubling of production. The average
<br />energy cost was obtained by integrating this expression over
<br />the number of machines of each size required to reach each
<br />capacity goal and dividing the sum by the number of
<br />machines. For example, the number of machines of 0.6 MW
<br />capacity needed to reach the capacity goal of 120 GW is
<br />200,000.
<br />As a starting point for the calculations, it was first assumed
<br />that the envelope of cost minima for each windspeed
<br />represented the cost of wind energy from the thousandth
<br />machine; the first doubling would then be achieved at the two-
<br />thousandth machine. Then the ordinal numbers (the "serial
<br />numbers" in a production run) shown in Table 1 were
<br />assumed for the production run called for by the energy
<br />target, and the experience rate of 95 percent (that used in the
<br />Kaman analysis from which the envelope was obtained) was
<br />
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<br />NOVEMBER 1981, Vol. 1031309
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