Laserfiche WebLink
<br />In support of the Federal program of solar energy <br />development, MITRE Corporation prepared a series of <br />studies [15] to develop experience curves and cost trends and <br />apply them to the problem of predicting the cost of solar- <br />related equipment, including large wind turbines. Their <br />studies did not, in general, make allowance for improvement <br />in product performance that would result from technological <br />improvements during the evolution of these products. Much <br />of the data was limited to only a few doublings of ac- <br />cumulated production, and the cost index used differed from <br />the value index used by the Boston Consulting Group. Their <br />curves show general trends common to a large majority of <br />products undergoing a cost bulge in the early to mid-1950s, an <br />easing of costs at the end of the 1950s and into the mid-1960s, <br />and a sharp upward inflection point at 1973. <br />Looking at both sets of data, two influences can be seen. <br />One is the experience effect; this is production-related and is <br />independent of the calendar, with each product having its own <br />rate of growth. The other is an external effect, calendar- <br />related, that tends to affect all products in the same way at the <br />same time. The external effect shows a lesser experience rate <br />in the 1950s, a greater experience rate in the early and mid- <br />1960s, and a sharp unfavorable inflection point at 1973. These <br />trends coincide almost exactly with trends in the productivity <br />of the private nonfarm business economy as shown in Fig. 5. <br />The MITRE study mentioned these external factors, but did <br />not investigate their causes beyond attributing them generally <br />to surges in the cost of labor and energy. The report men- <br />tioned a tendency for long-established products to exhibit <br />flatter experience curves than those of novel products. <br />However, if the calendar-related trend shown in Fig. 5 is <br />removed from the experience curves of the Boston Consulting <br />Group (14) and MITRE (15), little evidence remains of such a <br />distinction. The portion of the cost trend related to <br />production, the experience rate proper, continues in effect <br />even when externalities such as changes in the nationwide <br />productivity superimpose other cost trends of a less predic- <br />table nature. <br />In bringing these general considerations to bear on <br />estimating the cost of large wind turbines, the mission <br />analyses by General Electric [2], Kaman [3], and Lockheed [4] <br />allowed experience effects for relatively short production <br />runs, up to the thousandth unit (ten-thousandth in the case of <br />Lockheed). General Electric included estimates based on 85 <br />and 90-percent experience rates, since a wide variety of their <br />products in mass production have consistently demonstrated <br />rates close to 85 percent over the long pull. Analyses of ex- <br />pected experience rate made by Kaman [3] were based on the <br />assumption that certain major components of wind machines, <br />such as electrical elements and steel for towers, would be <br />purchased off-the-shelf from present manufacturers at <br />present prices and therefore would not contribute to the <br />experience rate. Kaman arrived thereby at an estimate very <br />close to 95 percent. This assumption may be justified so long <br />as wind machines represent only a small fraction of the <br />market for such off-the-shelf components, but appears <br />questionable as it becomes economically worthwhile to <br />redesign each component and produce it specifically for the <br />given product line, as Ford did [13]. The numbers adduced in <br />the analysis that follows suggest that this point would be <br />surpassed except for the very lowest national target, and that <br />the Kaman estimate of the experience rate may therefore be <br />unduly low. <br />In estimating the cost of large wind turbines, the MITRE <br />study followed the guidance of the General Electric [2] and <br />Kaman [3] mission analyses. It assumed that the cost of 958 <br />dollars per kW for the first "mass-produced" machine (in <br />1976 dollars) would decrease by 35 dollars with the second <br />machine and with each doubling thereafter until the <br />thousandth had been built, when cost would reach 609 dollars <br /> <br />Journal of Solar Energy Engineering <br /> <br /> 130 <br /> / <br /> / <br /> 120 / <br />;;; Trend ------y/ <br />-' <br /><t 110 / <br />u / <br />(J) <br />0 100 130 <br />~ / <br />a: *Cytlically / <br />0 90 / <br />Q adjusted ^ 120 <br />t-- / / <br /><D 60 / " <br />!!! / .' <br />X / ! 110 <br />w 70 /; I <br />0 <br />~ /,/ <br /> 60 100 <br /> 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 <br /> <br /> <br />-". . <br /> <br />YEARS <br /> <br />* The cyclical adjustment is based on a regression of productivity <br />on the current and lagged unemployment rate from 1960 to 1968. <br />Sources: Department of Labor and Council of Economic Advisers. <br /> <br />Fig,5 Productivity in the private nonfarm business economy, from the <br />Economic Report of the President (1978) <br /> <br />per kW and remain constant thereafter. This substituted an <br />assumption of fixed-dollar decline for the fixed-proportion <br />decline of the experience law, and terminated its efficacy at a <br />level of production two to four orders of magnitude smaller <br />than that characteristic of the other studies cited. In this form, <br />the MITRE projections became an input to the SPURR <br />(System for Projecting Utilization of Renewable Resources) <br />model used to generate estimates of relative market <br />penetration rates for solar technologies [16]. Beyond the <br />references cited, no justification was adduced for assuming a <br />constant product cost after the thousandth unit, and in their <br />search of the literature, the authors have found no other. <br />On the basis of these considerations, it was assumed for the <br />present calculations that an experience law would continue to <br />characterize the cost of large wind turbines, at least in relation <br />to other sources of energy. Experience rates of 95,90, and 85 <br />percent were selected for exploratory calculations. The 95 <br />percent rate has been characterized by Lindley [17] as con- <br />servative and appears to be so by comparison with other <br />authorities cited. The 85 percent rate may be described as <br />middle-of-the-road or optimistic, depending upon what <br />authority one chooses to accept. <br /> <br />Performing the Calculations. Calculations were made for <br />four different machine capacities: 0.3, 0.6, 1.2, and 2.4 MW. <br />The experience curve was expressed in analytic form: <br /> <br />cents/MJ =Anlog2b <br /> <br />where A is a constant dependent on the cost of energy from a <br />particular machine, n is the ordinal number of that machine in <br />the production run, and b is the experience rate expressed as <br />the cost decrease per doubling of production. The average <br />energy cost was obtained by integrating this expression over <br />the number of machines of each size required to reach each <br />capacity goal and dividing the sum by the number of <br />machines. For example, the number of machines of 0.6 MW <br />capacity needed to reach the capacity goal of 120 GW is <br />200,000. <br />As a starting point for the calculations, it was first assumed <br />that the envelope of cost minima for each windspeed <br />represented the cost of wind energy from the thousandth <br />machine; the first doubling would then be achieved at the two- <br />thousandth machine. Then the ordinal numbers (the "serial <br />numbers" in a production run) shown in Table 1 were <br />assumed for the production run called for by the energy <br />target, and the experience rate of 95 percent (that used in the <br />Kaman analysis from which the envelope was obtained) was <br /> <br /> <br />NOVEMBER 1981, Vol. 1031309 <br />