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<br />What is reasonable or unreasonable depends greatly, of <br />course, on estimates of cost-effectiveness and on how near or <br />how far we may be from the break-even point when wind- <br />power production will become profitable. Todd et al. [8], <br />have deduced that the combination of large windfarms sited <br />in especially windy places in the western United States with <br />hydroelectric pumped storage and long-distance transmission <br />of power to load centers would be cost-effective now in <br />comparison with new coal or nuclear-fueled base-load power <br />plants provided the windpowered generators now planned for <br />prototype production and testing before 1984 attain the cost- <br />of-electricity goals of 3-3.7 cents per kWh3 set for them by <br />the Department of Energy. If this situation should be verified, <br />it is possible that even the most sanguine estimates of wind- <br />power capability might be eclipsed, An issue paper prepared <br />for the Department of Energy [9] on the subject of an ac- <br />celerated program of wind power identified national goals for <br />the year 2000 of installed capacities ranging from 16 GW for <br />"business as usual" to 150 GW for an accelerated program. <br />The report on inexhaustible ene1rgy resources prepared for the <br />Department of Energy [10] projected 60 GW of installed <br />capacity as an "optimistic realistic" estimate for the year <br />2000 on the way to an 80 GW ceiling by the year 2010, with a <br />"realistic maximum" of 150 GW. In an assessment of en- <br />vironmental factors of wind energy conversion [11], The <br />Energy Research and Development Administration projected <br />consumption of electrical power from utility networks in the <br />year 2000 at 2400 GW, of which about 7 percent or 170 GW <br />might be the average power generated by wind with an ac- <br />celerated program of wind power development. At a capacity <br />factor of 0.34, this would correspond to 500 GW of installed <br />windpower capacity. <br />In view of this indefiniteness, the following calculations <br />embrace a range of goals from 12-1200 GW of installed <br />wind power capacity. This range is sufficiently broad to test <br />the sensitivity of energy cost to size of the goal from the trivial <br />to beyond what is considered likely. <br />Inseparable from any estimation of the nation's future <br />windpower goal is how far one must go in the direction of <br />lower mean windspeeds in ordet to fulfill it. One can estimate <br />from Figs. 2 and 3 that the cost of wind energy from an 8-m/s <br />site is almost double that from'a 1O.7-m/s site, and that the <br />optimum machine size for the former is about half that for the <br />latter. Presumably, the available sites with the highest wind <br />energy potential will be occupied first, going to progressively <br />lower winds peed sites until the goal is fulfilled. For example, <br />the potential from a 1O.7-m/s site is twice that from a 8-m/s <br />site, as shown in Figs. 2 and 3. <br />How rapidly the total windpower harvest would increase <br />with lower winds peed sites is suggested by Fig. 4, which shows <br />one estimate of how windpower potential and exposed land <br />areas increase with decreasing windspeed. If a given <br />proportion of the potential I~nd area in each winds peed <br />category were utilized for wind(arms, one might conclude by <br />comparing the respective cumulative capacities show on the <br />bottom scale of Fig. 4 that, of all the power harvested from <br />wind farms exceeding 8 m/s average winds peed , less than 1 <br />percent of the power (and less than 1/2 percent of the op- <br />timum-size machines indicated by Fig. 2) would be in wind- <br />farms exceeding 10.7 m/s. If even lower windspeed sites came <br />into use - say down to 6.7 m/s - these trends might be <br />further accentuated. <br />For the purposes of the present investigation, the <br />calculations for both the 8 and 1O.7-m/s windspeeds were <br />performed. <br /> <br />~81 dollars, in a 7,2-m/s wind regime. Material presented at public <br />meetings on the Wind Energy Systems Programs Plan from U .S, Department of <br />Energy Docket Number CAS-RM-8l-404, <br /> <br />308/VoI.103, NOVEMBER 1981 <br /> <br />CUMULATIVE AREA WITHIN 17 WESTERN STATES, km2 <br />I 10 1<1 103 104 10~ 106 <br />I I I I I I I <br /> <br />1 <br />I <br /> <br />CUMULATIVE FRACTION OF AREA <br />10-6 10-5 10-4 10-3 10-2 0,050,1 0,3 0.5 <br /> <br />1500 <br /> <br />1000 <br />'l' 800 <br />E <br />~ 600 <br />> <br />~ <br />en 400 <br />z <br />UJ <br />C <br />Q: <br />~ 200 <br />~ <br /> <br />~ <br /> <br />~"'c'I. <br />:q(q", <br />~-94G <br />~lt . <br />''''0 <br />s...~ <br />~04}' <br />4",~ <br />"'Clt,~}' <br />~-9 <br />..,.~, <br />GIf}' <br />, '1>'" <br /> <br /> <br />UJ <br />Cl <br />~ 100 <br />UJ <br />~ <br /> <br />0,01 QI 10 100 300 600 <br />CUMULATIVE PEAK POWER CAPACITY, GW (electrical) <br />Fig.4 Cumulative distribution of potential windpower as a function of <br />cumulative area exceeding given minimum windspeed, after Todd et al. <br />[81. Anemometer heights are from available records by Reed [121. <br /> <br />Estimation of the Experience Rate. The experience rate is of <br />crucial importance in estimating the cost of fulfilling the <br />windpower goal. Key questions concern the experience rate <br />itself and the length of the production run for which it may be <br />considered valid. <br />Experience leads to cost reduction in three ways. The first is <br />the learning curve of personnel engaged in a particular <br />manufacturing operation: it has a typical value of 70-80 <br />percent of the starting cost for each doubling of production, <br />but is progressively erased by personnel turnover and design <br />changes. The second way is by a program of cost reduction <br />consciously adopted and conscientiously followed by a single <br />producer for a single product line. The classic example is that <br />of the Ford Motor Company, which achieved an 85-percent <br />manufacturing experience rate for its Model T between 1908 <br />and 1926, terminated largely by a change in popular demand <br />from open to closed cars. This period embraced production of <br />about 13 million cars and more than 8 doublings of <br />production from a starting level of 40,000 per year [13]. <br />The third way, yielding an overall experience curve, is <br />through continual competition, technological development, <br />and managerial and capital adjustments affecting an entire <br />industry or group of industries. In a work regarded as <br />authoritative [14], the Boston Consulting Group examined <br />experience curves for a variety of industries through 1968 and <br />derived from them a universal law of cost reduction over <br />entire industries and families of related products, with most <br />of the industry-wide experience curves lying between 70 and <br />85 percent per doubling. <br />Limitless decrease in cost implied by this simple experience <br />law poses a paradox. It is resolved when one realizes that <br />production cannot indefinitely continue to grow ex- <br />ponentially. When production becomes constant, progress <br />down the cost curve slows and after a while becomes in- <br />significant because the doubling period becomes very long. <br />Furthermore, no industry enjoys eternal life; the experience <br />curve for the buggy-whip industry came to an end without <br />necessarily violating the law. <br /> <br />Transactions of the ASM E <br />