<br />What is reasonable or unreasonable depends greatly, of
<br />course, on estimates of cost-effectiveness and on how near or
<br />how far we may be from the break-even point when wind-
<br />power production will become profitable. Todd et al. [8],
<br />have deduced that the combination of large windfarms sited
<br />in especially windy places in the western United States with
<br />hydroelectric pumped storage and long-distance transmission
<br />of power to load centers would be cost-effective now in
<br />comparison with new coal or nuclear-fueled base-load power
<br />plants provided the windpowered generators now planned for
<br />prototype production and testing before 1984 attain the cost-
<br />of-electricity goals of 3-3.7 cents per kWh3 set for them by
<br />the Department of Energy. If this situation should be verified,
<br />it is possible that even the most sanguine estimates of wind-
<br />power capability might be eclipsed, An issue paper prepared
<br />for the Department of Energy [9] on the subject of an ac-
<br />celerated program of wind power identified national goals for
<br />the year 2000 of installed capacities ranging from 16 GW for
<br />"business as usual" to 150 GW for an accelerated program.
<br />The report on inexhaustible ene1rgy resources prepared for the
<br />Department of Energy [10] projected 60 GW of installed
<br />capacity as an "optimistic realistic" estimate for the year
<br />2000 on the way to an 80 GW ceiling by the year 2010, with a
<br />"realistic maximum" of 150 GW. In an assessment of en-
<br />vironmental factors of wind energy conversion [11], The
<br />Energy Research and Development Administration projected
<br />consumption of electrical power from utility networks in the
<br />year 2000 at 2400 GW, of which about 7 percent or 170 GW
<br />might be the average power generated by wind with an ac-
<br />celerated program of wind power development. At a capacity
<br />factor of 0.34, this would correspond to 500 GW of installed
<br />windpower capacity.
<br />In view of this indefiniteness, the following calculations
<br />embrace a range of goals from 12-1200 GW of installed
<br />wind power capacity. This range is sufficiently broad to test
<br />the sensitivity of energy cost to size of the goal from the trivial
<br />to beyond what is considered likely.
<br />Inseparable from any estimation of the nation's future
<br />windpower goal is how far one must go in the direction of
<br />lower mean windspeeds in ordet to fulfill it. One can estimate
<br />from Figs. 2 and 3 that the cost of wind energy from an 8-m/s
<br />site is almost double that from'a 1O.7-m/s site, and that the
<br />optimum machine size for the former is about half that for the
<br />latter. Presumably, the available sites with the highest wind
<br />energy potential will be occupied first, going to progressively
<br />lower winds peed sites until the goal is fulfilled. For example,
<br />the potential from a 1O.7-m/s site is twice that from a 8-m/s
<br />site, as shown in Figs. 2 and 3.
<br />How rapidly the total windpower harvest would increase
<br />with lower winds peed sites is suggested by Fig. 4, which shows
<br />one estimate of how windpower potential and exposed land
<br />areas increase with decreasing windspeed. If a given
<br />proportion of the potential I~nd area in each winds peed
<br />category were utilized for wind(arms, one might conclude by
<br />comparing the respective cumulative capacities show on the
<br />bottom scale of Fig. 4 that, of all the power harvested from
<br />wind farms exceeding 8 m/s average winds peed , less than 1
<br />percent of the power (and less than 1/2 percent of the op-
<br />timum-size machines indicated by Fig. 2) would be in wind-
<br />farms exceeding 10.7 m/s. If even lower windspeed sites came
<br />into use - say down to 6.7 m/s - these trends might be
<br />further accentuated.
<br />For the purposes of the present investigation, the
<br />calculations for both the 8 and 1O.7-m/s windspeeds were
<br />performed.
<br />
<br />~81 dollars, in a 7,2-m/s wind regime. Material presented at public
<br />meetings on the Wind Energy Systems Programs Plan from U .S, Department of
<br />Energy Docket Number CAS-RM-8l-404,
<br />
<br />308/VoI.103, NOVEMBER 1981
<br />
<br />CUMULATIVE AREA WITHIN 17 WESTERN STATES, km2
<br />I 10 1<1 103 104 10~ 106
<br />I I I I I I I
<br />
<br />1
<br />I
<br />
<br />CUMULATIVE FRACTION OF AREA
<br />10-6 10-5 10-4 10-3 10-2 0,050,1 0,3 0.5
<br />
<br />1500
<br />
<br />1000
<br />'l' 800
<br />E
<br />~ 600
<br />>
<br />~
<br />en 400
<br />z
<br />UJ
<br />C
<br />Q:
<br />~ 200
<br />~
<br />
<br />~
<br />
<br />~"'c'I.
<br />:q(q",
<br />~-94G
<br />~lt .
<br />''''0
<br />s...~
<br />~04}'
<br />4",~
<br />"'Clt,~}'
<br />~-9
<br />..,.~,
<br />GIf}'
<br />, '1>'"
<br />
<br />
<br />UJ
<br />Cl
<br />~ 100
<br />UJ
<br />~
<br />
<br />0,01 QI 10 100 300 600
<br />CUMULATIVE PEAK POWER CAPACITY, GW (electrical)
<br />Fig.4 Cumulative distribution of potential windpower as a function of
<br />cumulative area exceeding given minimum windspeed, after Todd et al.
<br />[81. Anemometer heights are from available records by Reed [121.
<br />
<br />Estimation of the Experience Rate. The experience rate is of
<br />crucial importance in estimating the cost of fulfilling the
<br />windpower goal. Key questions concern the experience rate
<br />itself and the length of the production run for which it may be
<br />considered valid.
<br />Experience leads to cost reduction in three ways. The first is
<br />the learning curve of personnel engaged in a particular
<br />manufacturing operation: it has a typical value of 70-80
<br />percent of the starting cost for each doubling of production,
<br />but is progressively erased by personnel turnover and design
<br />changes. The second way is by a program of cost reduction
<br />consciously adopted and conscientiously followed by a single
<br />producer for a single product line. The classic example is that
<br />of the Ford Motor Company, which achieved an 85-percent
<br />manufacturing experience rate for its Model T between 1908
<br />and 1926, terminated largely by a change in popular demand
<br />from open to closed cars. This period embraced production of
<br />about 13 million cars and more than 8 doublings of
<br />production from a starting level of 40,000 per year [13].
<br />The third way, yielding an overall experience curve, is
<br />through continual competition, technological development,
<br />and managerial and capital adjustments affecting an entire
<br />industry or group of industries. In a work regarded as
<br />authoritative [14], the Boston Consulting Group examined
<br />experience curves for a variety of industries through 1968 and
<br />derived from them a universal law of cost reduction over
<br />entire industries and families of related products, with most
<br />of the industry-wide experience curves lying between 70 and
<br />85 percent per doubling.
<br />Limitless decrease in cost implied by this simple experience
<br />law poses a paradox. It is resolved when one realizes that
<br />production cannot indefinitely continue to grow ex-
<br />ponentially. When production becomes constant, progress
<br />down the cost curve slows and after a while becomes in-
<br />significant because the doubling period becomes very long.
<br />Furthermore, no industry enjoys eternal life; the experience
<br />curve for the buggy-whip industry came to an end without
<br />necessarily violating the law.
<br />
<br />Transactions of the ASM E
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