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Last modified
7/14/2011 11:26:07 AM
Creation date
1/18/2008 1:10:01 PM
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Publications
Year
2005
Title
A Legal Analysis of Sporhase V Nebraska
CWCB Section
Administration
Author
Charles T DuMars
Description
A Legal Analysis of Sporhase V Nebraska
Publications - Doc Type
Legal Analysis
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<br />commercial and political unity was not by accident. He had just offered a vision ofa new . <br />nation bound together by commerce: <br /> <br />An unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will advance <br />the trade of each by an interchange of their respective productions, not <br />only for the supply of reciprocal wants at home, but for exportation to <br />foreign markets. The veins of commerce in every part will be replenished, <br />and will acquire additional motion and vigor from a free circulation of the <br />commodities of every part. <br /> <br />ld., No. 11 at 89 (Alexander Hamilton). <br /> <br />2 While the Commerce Clause says only that Congress can "regulate Commerce with foreign Nation, and <br />among the several State, and with the Indian Tribes," U.S. CONST I, 9 8(3), this statement has long been <br />understood to include the ability to prevent any improper interference with interstate trade. See <br />Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 6] 7, 623 (1978) (states are free to regulate commerce "so long as <br />they act within the restraints imposed by the Commerce Clause itself. (citation omitted) The bounds of <br />these restraints appear nowhere in the words of the Commerce Clause, but have emerged gradually i the <br />decisions of this Court giving effect to its basic purpose."). As John Marshall wrote, "Congress' aut ority <br />to regulate commerce equals the power "to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This <br />power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and <br />acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U S. at <br />] 96. Practically speaking, this proposition means that the states cannot so legislate as to hinder or i pede <br />interstate commerce: "Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or admit only of ne <br />uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusi e <br />legislation by Congress." Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 3] 9 (185]), overruled on other gr unds <br />by Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). Thus, the "negative" or "dormant" <br />Commerce Clause "denies the States the power unjustifiably to discriminate against or burden the in erstate . <br />flow of articles of commerce." Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 5]] U.S. 93, 98 (199 ). <br /> <br />4 <br />
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