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<br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />distinctions, the wise would lament that the union had not been formed <br />before. Wherefore, the present time is the true time for establishing it. <br /> <br />THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE, <br />http://vvww.constitution.org/civ/comsense.htm (emphasis added). <br /> <br />available <br /> <br />at <br /> <br />In the struggle to gain ratification of the Constitution, the need for free trade <br />between the states was raised again and again as a rationale for a strong federal <br />government. Alexander Hamilton wrote: <br /> <br />IN ADDITION to the defects already enumerated in the existing federal <br />system, there are others of not less importance, which concur in rendering <br />it altogether unfit for the administration of the affairs of the Union. <br />The want of a power to regulate commerce is by all parties allowed <br />to be of the number. . . . It is indeed evident, on the most superficial view, <br />that there is no object, either as it respects the interests of trade or finance, <br />that more strongly demands a federal superintendence. The want of it has <br />already operated as a bar to the formation of beneficial treaties with <br />foreign powers, and has given occasions of dissatisfaction between the <br />States. <br /> <br />THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 143-44 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). <br /> <br />Not surprisingly, James Madison concurred: <br /> <br />The defect of power in the existing Confederacy to regulate the commerce <br />between its several members, . . . [has] been clearly pointed out by <br />experience. To the proofs and remarks which former papers have brought <br />into view on this subject, it may be added that without this supplemental <br />provision, the great and essential power of regulating foreign commerce <br />would have been incomplete and ineffectual. A very material object of <br />this power was the relief of the States which import and export through <br />other States, from the improper contributions levied on them by the latter. <br />Were these at liberty to regulate the trade between State and State, it must <br />be foreseen that ways would be found out to load the articles of import and <br />export, during the passage through their jurisdiction, with duties which <br />would fall on the makers of the latter and the consumers of the former. <br />We may be assured by past experience, that such a practice would be <br />introduced by future contrivances; and both by that and a common <br />knowledge of human affairs, that it would nourish unceasing animosities, <br />and not improbably terminate in serious interruptions of the public <br />tranquillity. <br /> <br />ld., No. 42 at 267-68 (James Madison). Hamilton had already put the point succinctly: <br />"A unity of commercial, as well as political, interests, can only result from a unity of <br />government." ld., No. 11 at 89 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton's equation of <br /> <br />3 <br />