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<br />principle of "first in time, first in <br />right." Thus, junior appropriators <br />receive no water until senior ap- <br />propriators-those with the old- <br />est rights-have received their full <br />allotment. <br />· Failure to use water for some <br />period of time results in loss of the <br />right. This provision creates a use- <br />it-or-Iose-it incentive, encouraging <br />withdrawal even when the water <br /> <br />place or use to another will com- <br />monly affect third parties-those <br />other than the buyer and seller. <br />When a farmer sells-in effect, <br />transfers-water to a city, the eco- <br />nomic base of the water-exporting <br />community may decline. And <br />when a transfer alters the quantity <br />of water in a stream, other stream <br />users are likely to be affected. In- <br />deed, changes in flow affect the <br /> <br />As supplies become scarcer, governments are <br /> <br />assuming a more active role in controlling <br /> <br />water use. <br /> <br />contributes little if any value to the <br />user. <br />Appropriative rights encourage <br />the depletion of waters in a stream. <br />Until recently, such instream flows <br />lacked protection under state wa- <br />ter laws. Unlike riparian rights, ap- <br />propriative rights can be transfer- <br />able, but sales are commonly <br />restricted as to how and where wa- <br />ter can be used. <br />Public permits. Riparian and ap- <br />propriative water rights initially <br />were acquired without state inter- <br />ference. But as supplies become <br />scarcer, governments are assuming <br />a more active role in controlling <br />water use. Some form of a permit <br />system now governs use of at least <br />some water in virtually every coun- <br />try.4 <br />In principle, water permits can <br />be auctioned by governments and <br />bought and sold in private markets. <br />In practice, however, permits are <br />usually free, and transfers are lim- <br />ited by the nature of the right as <br />well as by the infrastructure avail- <br />able to store and transport water. <br />Transferring water from one <br /> <br />56 . FORUM fOr Appli.d R."arch and Public Policy <br /> <br />amenities and recreational oppor- <br />tunities that rivers and lakes pro- <br />vide, as well as the individuals who <br />enjoy them. Generally, these wa- <br />ter services are public goods that <br />are not marketed, because the pub- <br />lic cannot be excluded from freely <br />enjoying them. Thus when mar- <br />keting water, the private sector <br />tends to ignore the impacts of wa- <br />ter transfers on the public goods <br />the waters produce. Similarly, pol- <br />luters underinvest in waste reduc- <br />tion and treatment when the costs <br />of using water bodies for waste dis- <br />posal are borne by society rather <br />than the individual polluter. <br />During the past three decades, <br />water-related investments and leg- <br />islation in the United States have <br />been driven largely by a desire to <br />protect the resource and the pub- <br />lic benefits it provides. The result- <br />ing environmental legislation and <br />regulations have contributed to <br />uncertainties over water rights. On <br />one side are the traditional users <br />with rights established when wa- <br />ter was treated as a free resource <br />and environmental impacts were <br /> <br /> <br />ignored. On the othe side are the <br />more-recently empo ered stake- <br />holders armed with I gislation de- <br />signed to protect an restore en- <br />vironmental and recr ational uses. <br />While domestic, in ustrial, and <br />agricultural users may compete for <br />the water diverted f om streams <br />and reservoirs, all thr e groups vie <br />with environmentalist and recrea- <br />tionists over the amo nt that can <br />be withdrawn. Confli ts also arise <br />over the priority that dam opera- <br />tors give to flood co trot water <br />supplies, hydropower production, <br />fish habitat, and recr ational op- <br />portunities. Without arkets and <br />prices to guide allocat'on of water <br />and guide dam and res rvoir man- <br />agement, conflicts are ften played <br />out in the courts or dministra- <br />tive proceedings. <br />Groundwater In! ially was <br />treated as a resource th t landown- <br />ers could capture at <br />groundwater is often common <br />property resource that ows from <br />one property to anothe until cap- <br />tured for use. Pumpi g can ad- <br />versely affect third pa ties. One <br />party's pumping can educe the <br />water available to ne ghboring <br />water users, forcing the to pump <br />from greater depths an lowering <br />their well yields. Third arties may <br />also be harmed if groun water use <br />reduces surface flows, c uses salt- <br />water intrusion into an quifer, or <br />results in the collapse of lands <br />above underground aq ifers that <br />have been at least partiall drained. <br />The emergence of suc impacts, <br />along with improved kno ledge of <br />the links between groun~ and sur- <br />face water, have led to rjstrictions <br />on groundwater use. In t e western <br />United States, for insta ce, most <br />states have adopted some orm of a <br />permit system for ground ater. But <br />even in states lacking a p mit sys- <br />tem-such as Texas, whic contin- <br /> <br />