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<br /> <br />Water Market. <br />Markets and prices <br />play a role in allo- <br />cation of resour.ces <br />among competing <br />uses, and they provide incentives <br />to conserve and invest in new sup- <br />plies. In a competitive economy, <br />price adjustments and market <br />transfers keep supply and demand <br />in balance. Prices rise when de- <br />mand increases faster than supply. <br />Higher prices provide incentives to <br />use less, to produce more, and to <br />develop and adopt technologies that <br />conserve use and increase output. <br />Markets enable resources to move <br />from lower to higher-value uses as <br />conditions change. For example, wa- <br />ter traditionally used for irrigation <br />may be more valuable as a munici- <br />pal water source as the demands of <br />a nearby urban center increase. <br />Tradable water rights potentially <br />can encourage conservation and a <br />more economically efficient alloca- <br />tion of scarce water resources. Cur- <br />rently, water is underpriced and of- <br />ten allocated based on institutions <br />established when water was not con- <br />sidered to be a scarce resource. Us- <br />ers pay nothing for the water itself. <br />Municipal and industrial users typi- <br />cally pay a fee reflecting the costs of <br />storing, delivering, and treating <br />water supplies. But even these costs <br />are likely to be subsidized for irri- <br />gation, which commonly represents <br />a region's largest water use. With- <br />out an opportunity to sell unused <br />supplies, irrigators have little incen- <br />tive to conserve water. With the in- <br />troduction of tradable water rights, <br />however, users value water in terms <br />of its opportunity cost-the value <br />they could get by selling water- <br />rather than at the subsidized price <br />they pay for it. <br />In spite of their potential ben- <br />efits and growing popularity, mar- <br /> <br />ket forces have been slow to adapt <br />to the reality of water scarcity. Ef- <br />ficient markets require well- <br />defined, transferable property <br />rights, and the full costs and ben- <br />efits of a transfer must be borne <br />by the buyers and sellers. Both the <br />nature of the resource and the in- <br />stitutions that manage and allo- <br />cate water can make it difficult to <br />meet these conditions. <br /> <br />ownership of land. They continue <br />to provide the basis of water law <br />in many areas, including some arid <br />Moslem and humid European <br />countries and the eastern United <br />States. These rights are poorly de- <br />fined because shortages are shared <br />by all riparian owners and use is <br />subject to regulatory or judicial <br />interpretation as to what is reason- <br />able or might unduly inconve- <br /> <br />Market forces have been slow to adapt to the reality <br /> <br />of water scarcity. <br /> <br />Ob.tacle. <br />The variability of water <br />supplies in time and <br />space creates problems <br />for establishing clear <br />property rights. Driven by energy <br />from the sun, water constantly <br />evaporates from seas, lakes, and <br />streams or transpires from plants, <br />entering the atmosphere, then re- <br />turning to earth through precipi- <br />tation. Precipitation that is not <br />quickly evaporated or transpired <br />back to the atmosphere is the <br />source of a region's renewable wa- <br />ter supplies. This water flows into <br />lakes, rivers, groundwater reser- <br />voirs, and eventually the ocean, <br />unless it is first withdrawn for use. <br />Three basic systems-riparian <br />rights, prior appropriation rights, <br />and public permits-have devel- <br />oped for establishing rights to this <br />water. <br />Riparian rights. The common law <br />system of riparian rights gives own- <br />ers of the lands bordering a water <br />body use of the water in ways that <br />do not unduly inconvenience <br />other riparian owners. Riparian <br />rights have origins in the earliest <br />legal systems establishing private <br /> <br />nience others. Moreover, riparian <br />rights are not directly marketable <br />because they are attached to the <br />land and use is restricted to those <br />lands. <br />Appropriative rights. Constraints <br />on transferring water to non- <br />riparian lands and uncertainties <br />such as how much water a ripar- <br />ian owner can use are obstacles to <br />applying riparian rights in areas <br />where streams are fewer and flows <br />are smaller and less reliable. Con- <br />sequently, in the arid and semi- <br />arid western United States, ripar- <br />ian rights were abandoned in favor <br />of water rights based on prior ap- <br />propriation. Prior appropriation <br />rights, which have been adapted <br />by all 17 western states, have three <br />principal features: <br />. Water rights are established by <br />withdrawing water from its natu- <br />ral source and putting it to a ben- <br />eficial use, such as irrigation. Un- <br />like the owner of riparian rights, <br />the party appropriating water does <br />not have to be a riparian land- <br />owner, and the water does not have <br />to be used on riparian lands. <br />. During periods of shortage, wa- <br />ter is allocated according to the <br /> <br />Spring 2001 . 55 <br />