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Snyder and Coupal (2005) have determ ined that, in a similar situation, well <br /> shut-downs on the Eastern Snake Ri ver Aquifer in Idaho would cause <br /> losses that greatly exceed the eventual benefits to calling surface water <br /> users. <br /> 4) Any gains from well shut down to calling seniors will be very long in <br /> coming due to slowly rising water tabl es and aquifer-to-stream flows. This <br /> is not to deny that stream flows ma y be reduced for a long time in those <br /> reaches where water tables have decl ined steadily over time. However, not <br /> all reaches of the South Platte have experienced falling water tables <br /> in their tributary aquifers (Col orado Division of Water Resources, <br /> Pottorff, 2007, "Ground Water Levels in the Alluvial Aquifers of the <br /> Lower South Platte River Basin"). <br />5) It seems to be assumed that pumping by unaugmented irrigators is the <br /> major cause of the surface shortage. In a very similar situation on the East <br /> Snake Aquifer in Idaho, the Idaho De partment of Water Resources surface <br /> water-groundwater model has determin ed that the shortages on the Snake <br /> that have prompted calls are due 1/ 3 to drought conditions, 1/3 to recent <br /> changes from flood irrigation to sprinklers and 1/3 to groundwater <br /> pumping (Snyder & Coupal, Feb. 2005, "Assessment of Relative <br /> Economic Consequences of Curtailm ent of Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer <br /> Ground Water Irrigation Ri ghts", report to the IDWR). Under Colorado <br /> regulations, pumpers must fully au gment whenever there is a call, <br /> whatever the cause of the surface sh ortage. Water right and lease prices <br /> have now risen to unaffordable levels for most of agri culture. The Central <br /> WAS offered $ 200/acre-foot in 2006 and had no takers (Cech <br /> correspondence). This implies perman ent loss of optimal use of the <br /> aquifer. <br />6) Water markets can play a central ro le in reducing these costs and <br /> alleviating the result ant conflict among parties in the Basin when <br /> appropriate conditions hold. In theo ry, one would expect those <br /> injured by calls to buy out or subordi nate the callers if, indeed, the values <br /> of water to those injured exceed th ose of the callers. In a "perfectly <br /> functioning" water market, one would expect that priorities would, over <br /> time, come to be perfectly correlated with marginal values of water, e.g. <br /> senior rights would all be owned by cities, industries or perhaps high- <br /> valued recreational uses while j unior rights would be owned by lower- <br /> valued users, probably crop agricultu re. In such a situation, there would <br /> be no reason for calls and no rema ining worthwhile water transfers. <br />7) The problem is that most wate r markets involve high "transactions <br /> costs"( Howe, Boggs and Butler, U. of Colo. Law Review, Vol. 61, Issue <br /> 2, 1990), i.e. legal, engineering and court costs, eliminating many <br /> otherwise beneficial water transfers. The effects of low transaction costs <br />2 <br />