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<br />001458 <br /> <br />to revoke the consent or modify the compact. There might <br /> <br />also be a more part~cularized objection to the power of <br />Congress to alter a compact by merely reallocating the rights <br />which the compact has provided to particular states without <br />at the same time making basic changes to the underlying <br /> <br />arrangement. Absent extraordinary circumstances, such as a <br /> <br />severe and chronic drought in the Upper Basin, or an urgent <br /> <br />national need for a crash program to develop Upper Basin <br />energy resources, the Federal interest in simply taking away <br />water from one state and giving it to another may be diffi- <br /> <br />cult to justify. <br /> <br />Moreover, to the extent that such a <br /> <br />transaction would impair the water rights of.ind;vidMaJ, <br /> <br /> <br />residents of a particular state, it may be a "taking" <br /> <br />compensible under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. <br /> <br />Nonetheless, the long-standing and detailed Federal <br /> <br />involvement in the negotiation of the Colorado River Compact, <br /> <br />in the construction and operation of the vast system of dams <br /> <br />and diversion works on the River, and in the management and <br /> <br />delivery of the water of the River may peculiarly qualify <br /> <br />Congress to intervene in the delicate matter of the Compact's <br /> <br />scheme for apportioning water between the Basins. This <br /> <br />Federal intimacy in the affairs of the River clearly <br /> <br />influenced the Supreme Court in deciding in the fourth <br />Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), that Congress had <br /> <br />apportioned the River water among the Lower Basin states by <br />passing the Boulder Canyon Project Act. See 373 U.S. at <br /> <br />-33- <br />