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<br />001457 <br /> <br />with Article IV(a) of the Compact, which subordinates <br />navigational use of the River to domestic, agricultural, and <br />power purposes and which also asserts that the River "has <br />ceased to be navigable." Despite severability language in <br />Article IV of the Compact inviting Congress to withhold its <br />consent to that particular subordination provision without <br />upsetting the entire Compact, Congress approved the entire <br />Compact without reservation. 43 U.S.C. ~617.1. Moreover, <br />section 8 of the Act, 43 U.S.C. fi6l7g, subjects the operation <br />of the dam and reservoir to the provisions of the Compact. <br />In the face of this discrepancy, the Court declared that lithe <br />specific statement of primary purpose in the Act governs the <br />gen~ral references to the Compact," 283 U.S. at 4S6, and held <br />that the legislation was valid, even though it was based on a <br />factual premise which the Compact contradicted and was at <br />odds with a Compact directive to which it had declared itself <br />subject. Recently, the power of Congress to legislate with <br />respect to interstate water was broadened by Sporhase <br />v. Nebraska ex reI. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982). <br />A slight question about Congress' general authority to <br />adjust interstate compacts unilaterally may linger as a <br />legacy of Poole v. Fleeqer, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 185 (1837), <br />which held that the Compact Clause is a limit upon the states <br />inherent power to Compact, rather than a grant of power to do <br />so. consequently, it may be argued that once having given <br />its consent to an interstate compact, Congress is powerless <br /> <br />-32- <br />