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<br />. ~'''''6 <br />OD10') <br /> <br />922 <br /> <br />ECOLOGY lAW QUARTERLY <br /> <br />[Vol. 28:903 <br /> <br />I <br /> <br />agreements, litigation, and settlements as every state, water <br />district, irrigator, and municipality nervously eyed others who <br />sought to increase their water appropriations. log Consistent with <br />these fears, the Law of the River contains numerous provisions <br />that block transfers of water within the Colorado system and <br />serve to keep the initial, historic allocations intact. Although a <br />full account of these legal restrictions is beyond the scope of this <br />article, this section provides an overview of the relevant rulesYo <br />The first set of these restrictions derives from the traditional <br />notion of beneficial use that appears throughout the Law of the <br />River. Article I of the 1922, Compac~ establishes the "relative <br />importance of different beneficial uses of water."lll While <br />"beneficial use" is not defmed,112 a definition maybe implied from <br />Article III(e), which provides: "[t]he states of the Upper Division <br />shall not withhold water, and the states of the Lower Division <br />shall not require the delivery of water, which cannot reasonably <br />be applied to domestic and agricultural uses. "113 "Domestic use" <br />is defined, however, and includes: "the use of water for <br />household, stock, municipal, mining, milling, industrial and <br />other like purposes.... "114 The Compact does not protect <br />instream flows or use of water for the benefit of fish and wildlife <br />as beneficial uses. ,Because Comp~ct parties only have the right <br />to "beneficial use" of water,l15 the transfer of water by any party <br />for an environmental use clearly violates the rights of the other <br />parties to the'Compact. <br />Political resistance could pose yet another obstacle, <br />particularly for transfers from the Upper Basin. Upper Basin <br />states fear that allowing downstream users to purchase, or even <br />lease, water rights will rob them of water needed for future <br />development.116 Strange as it may seem, Lower Basin states also <br /> <br />109. The conflict that led, ultimately, to Arizona v. California. 373 U.S. 546 (1963), <br />provides an excellent example of the effects of such fears. <br />110. It should suffice to say that various provisions of the 1922 Compact, the <br />Upper Basin Compact, the Operating Criteria, the BCPA. the Treaty of 1944, and <br />Arizona v. California restrict transfers between and within the Upper Basin. Lower <br />Basin, and Mexico. Additional contractual restrictions may also apply, such as <br />California's Seven party Agreement and the recent Quantification Agreement. See <br />infra Part IV.C. <br />Ill. See Colorado River Compact, supra note 47. art. 1. <br />112. See id. art. II. <br />113. See id. art I1I(e). <br />114. See id. art II(h). <br />115. See id. art. I. <br />116. RICHARD W. WAHL. MARKETs FOR FEDERAL WATER: SUBSIDIES, PROPERlY RIGHTS, <br />AND THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION 279 (1989). <br /> <br />I <br /> <br /> <br />, <br />