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<br />DJ15J5 <br /> <br />2002] <br /> <br />THE lAST GREEN lAGOON <br /> <br />921 <br /> <br />however, Arizona had to guarantee that California could take its <br />full share before any water was delivered to CAP.103 As a result, <br />CAP has historically had the lowest priority allocation - after <br />California, Nevada, present perfected rights, and the Tribes. 104 <br />This problem has been solved - at least temporarily - by the <br />execution of a contract between the State of Arizona and MWD.105 <br />As discussed in Section N below, in exchange for Arizona's <br />support of the new Interim Surplus Criteria, MWD was forced to <br />provide Arizona with a 1 maf "insurance policy" under which it <br />will forego its own use in favor of Arizona in the event of <br />shortages on the river.106 However, after. the expiration of this <br />agreement, CAP water will again be the first on the chopping <br />block. As a result, CAP's long term reliability as a supply of water <br />may shrink as demands on Upper Basin water grow. While BOR <br />predicted an average annual delivery of 1.2 maf over the life of <br />CAP, critics estimate it will fall as development upstream reduces <br />surpluses. 107 <br /> <br />B. Keeping the Status Quo: Restrictions on Transfers in the Law <br />of the River <br /> <br />Although transfers of water from one user to another, <br />particularly market-based transfers, would have allowed the <br />water of the Colorado to migrate over time to higher economic <br />value uses, the politics surrounding the Law of the River have <br />long been dominated by efforts to block such transfers. In fact, <br />the development .of the Law of the River has been driven largely <br />by fear. The 1922 Compact negotiations began in response to <br />Upper Basin states' fears that Lower Basin states, particularly <br />California, would eventually acquire rights to the entire flow of <br />the Colorado, leaving the Upper Basin with inadequate water for <br />future economic development. lOB Similar fears drove subsequent <br /> <br />103. SeeAbbott, supra note 68. at 1408. <br />104. See Robert J. Glennon, Coattails of the Past; Using and Financing the Central <br />AnzonaProject, 27 ARIz. ST. L.J. 677. 711-15 (1995). <br />105. See discussion infra Part IV. <br />106. See discussion infra Part IV. <br />107. SeeFRADKlN, supra note 9, at 259. AriZona can argue that the Colorado River <br />Compact requires the Upper Basin to release 75 maf every 10 years. See Glennon, <br />supra note 104, at 711-712. However, although the Upper Basin is obligated to <br />deliver at least 75 maf to the Lower Basin every 10 years. under Article lll(c) of the <br />Compact, the Upper and Lower Basins may share the obligation to deliver Mexico's <br />entitlement equally if surplus water is not available to satisfY the demand. See <br />Colorado River Compact, supra note 47, article lll(c),(d). <br />108. See Sergio J. Viscoli. The Resource Conservation Group Proposal to Lease <br />Colorado River Water, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 887, 892 (1991). <br />