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Last modified
8/15/2009 6:00:54 PM
Creation date
7/26/2007 1:58:11 PM
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IBCC Process Program Material
Title
Colorado’s Interbasin Compact Negotiations: Development of an Institutional Framework - Lessons from the Literature
Date
12/17/2004
Author
Russel George, Frank McNulty, Peter Nichols, Eric Hecox
IBCC - Doc Type
Program Planning, Budget & Contracts
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Revised: 7/26/2007 <br /> <br />Legislative Apportionment – Congressional Allocation <br />? <br /> <br />Congress has been reluctant to legislate interstate water allocation, but has done <br />so in two “special and unique circumstances”. These included the Boulder <br />Canyon Project Act and the Truckee - Carson - Pyramid Lake Water Rights <br />Settlement Act. <br />? <br /> <br />Leg islative apportionment has two drawbacks: 1) typical members do not have <br />specialized knowledge necessary to deal with certain aspects of water disputes, <br />and 2) apportionment is based on political reality instead of notions of efficiency <br />and equity. <br />? <br /> <br />Clemons (2004) believes this is the fastest and most decisive method, but is <br />extremely rate. <br />Interstate Water Compacts – cross - jurisdictional negotiation <br />? <br /> <br />While negotiating compacts, states attempt to anticipate future uses of water and <br />apportion rights accordingl y. <br />? <br /> <br />Advantages of compacts over other methods of apportionment: <br /> <br />Compacts tend to focus on elements of harmony and mutuality instead of <br />o <br />divisive factors highlighted by litigation. <br /> <br />The more unpredictable litigation is, the more the disputing states have an <br />o <br />in centive to work out an allocation between themselves. <br /> <br />The unpredictability of apportionment litigation can provide needed <br />o <br />political cover for state officials engaged in compact negotiations. <br /> <br />They provide a framework for a dynamic and ongoing approach to <br />o <br />in terstate problems. <br /> <br />They centralize information thus lowering transaction costs. <br />o <br /> <br />Compacts generate a level of certainty. <br />o <br /> <br />Compacts usually have a judicial safety valve built into them should the <br />o <br />commission system fail to adequately deal with unforeseen circu mstances. <br /> <br />States retain more autonomy with compact negotiations than they do with <br />o <br />other methods. <br />? <br /> <br />Drawbacks to Compacts: <br /> <br />Supply estimates and other information/data can be inaccurate. <br />o <br /> <br />Outside (federal) interference with the compact mechanism. <br />o <br /> <br />? Can be minimiz ed if the federal government is a party to the <br />compact. <br /> <br />Compacts can create short - term uncertainty for users. <br />o <br /> <br />Given the requirement for consensus agreement, they often result in <br />o <br />“watered - down” decisions. <br /> <br />? Consequently most compact commissions (see below) ha ve a “soft <br />management” emphasis, concentrating on the collection and <br />dissemination of basin - wide information and acting as an advocate. <br />? <br /> <br />Structure of Compacts <br /> <br />Most compacts (but not all) create a compact commission to administer the <br />o <br />terms of the agreement. <br /> <br />? Most compact commissions are headed by governor appointees <br />and have non - voting federal members. <br />3 <br />
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