7 Lessons from the Literature

• Title: Colorado’s Interbasin Compact Negotiations: Development of an Institutional Framework - Lessons from the Literature
• Date: 12/17/2004
• Author: Russel George, Frank McNulty, Peter Nichols, Eric Hecox
• IBCC - Doc Type: Program Planning, Budget & Contracts

Revised: 7/26/2007

Legislative Apportionment – Congressional Allocation
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Congress has been reluctant to legislate interstate water allocation, but has done
so in two “special and unique circumstances”. These included the Boulder
Canyon Project Act and the Truckee - Carson - Pyramid Lake Water Rights
Settlement Act.
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Leg islative apportionment has two drawbacks: 1) typical members do not have
specialized knowledge necessary to deal with certain aspects of water disputes,
and 2) apportionment is based on political reality instead of notions of efficiency
and equity.
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Clemons (2004) believes this is the fastest and most decisive method, but is
extremely rate.
Interstate Water Compacts – cross - jurisdictional negotiation
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While negotiating compacts, states attempt to anticipate future uses of water and
apportion rights accordingl y.
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Advantages of compacts over other methods of apportionment:

Compacts tend to focus on elements of harmony and mutuality instead of
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divisive factors highlighted by litigation.

The more unpredictable litigation is, the more the disputing states have an
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in centive to work out an allocation between themselves.

The unpredictability of apportionment litigation can provide needed
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political cover for state officials engaged in compact negotiations.

They provide a framework for a dynamic and ongoing approach to
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in terstate problems.

They centralize information thus lowering transaction costs.
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Compacts generate a level of certainty.
o

Compacts usually have a judicial safety valve built into them should the
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commission system fail to adequately deal with unforeseen circu mstances.

States retain more autonomy with compact negotiations than they do with
o
other methods.
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Drawbacks to Compacts:

Supply estimates and other information/data can be inaccurate.
o

Outside (federal) interference with the compact mechanism.
o

? Can be minimiz ed if the federal government is a party to the
compact.

Compacts can create short - term uncertainty for users.
o

Given the requirement for consensus agreement, they often result in
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“watered - down” decisions.

? Consequently most compact commissions (see below) ha ve a “soft
management” emphasis, concentrating on the collection and
dissemination of basin - wide information and acting as an advocate.
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Structure of Compacts

Most compacts (but not all) create a compact commission to administer the
o
terms of the agreement.

? Most compact commissions are headed by governor appointees
and have non - voting federal members.
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