|
<br />0025~6
<br />
<br />i;lr.:J'_'~-li (,f.n:' 1:, r.v5~U\'t.: \"~lell j'" t::.~rI-'IL-'. Wb~jl H
<br />~rnL'S ;.:..:, .1. ...:r(~;:i\'(" i.:){~u~. and when it dtrIIOItSlr.3lt~
<br />appropriate soOal dynamic.... This middle rang~ of
<br />c-onflir. needs [0 be ~cti\'e1y sought
<br />In m~ny endan.~ered species c.a.:\e.s. panicipanL<;' lack
<br />an explicit understanding of conrliCl as a social force
<br />and of the tools 3\'ailaule lO deal effeC(i\'e1~' and pro-
<br />ducu\'dy wirh it. Too many people see conflict on I\' in
<br />ltrrns of fJersonali[ie~. and they lend (0 disInlsS it as
<br />unrt5(ll~';]hk o. ignore it ;15 (lUL'iide of thci:" al-eJ of
<br />(lllllt'r:' (jOCU:;;ill,::: ~olt-':~. 011 Ille lcchni...-:tl m:\(lcrS :31
<br />~. . :.. \ '.;::' (' ~-J;'.:l5 .11~' ~,:'\)dll:-t ("f "h:l,-4"" innl-
<br />
<br />'1'..,,1~~111G.1""~,:: ;j'.J!On:l{'oJ f}()(I: 01."::,1.:li.':1LirJn:~1
<br />arriln6t'menL~ (lnJ~' compounds (he problclll_ In ;m~
<br />coa~Lion wilh numel""ous and divenc:: levels, specialized
<br />divisions, and imerdependence among subgroups.
<br />Hr8\\'n n9S1. p. 15) nOles. "if you rlon'( man(Jge inl('r-
<br />fare (onflicI.5, inlerLl(C' cOllflicts will manage you."
<br />This has dearl}' happened in some recover)' programs
<br />uanllng- aboul confliCl in an org-anization. hmh (01\-
<br />((,pllJ.lIJ~' and pr2c!Jc..1IJ\' (i,e,. knnwjng hO\\ In m.<::ln;!gr'
<br />II produCli\'ely)_ l~ t's~elluaJ.
<br />
<br />Obstacles to Improved Recovery Programs
<br />
<br />Rt'2Jislic\!ly. \\T IIlUSI recognize thai man\' IJUre;:w-
<br />C1-Jl1L ou~lad~s to (il.iIlg{; c.::u~t (\v'an\-jl:k .i.,I.,. -L ;C::\'
<br />19S:;)-evcn if change \','OlIld bring more effective
<br />species. recovery programs. The term "dynamically
<br />(omeT"'\';uivc" beSl describes bureaucracies' ahibt~. to
<br />mairnalll a cognitive, structural, and JX>lit..ical st..J.tu~
<br />quo despite all o\'en...helming neeo for change and im-
<br />pruvement (Schon 197 J). Man)' authors have studi~J
<br />bureaucratic resisL.3f1cc lO change and have obsened
<br />Lhat eXJsting institlll..ionalil.ed progrdms have vested in-
<br />tef(~'SLS ill the current definition of the problem
<br />(Welchm.n 1971. Arg)TIs and Schon 1978, Kau and
<br />Kahn 1978, Daft 1983, Der)' 1984). Programs mar be
<br />maintained and defended, at all COS1.5, e\'en if the re-
<br />covery task presents an insoluble dilemma to an
<br />agency as me agency is presently organized (\Veinberg
<br />198G)
<br />How are poorly performing or failed recover)' pro-
<br />~rams seen by participants? OfLen, '.out.sidc eveOlS
<br />be\'ond Our coOlrol" are identified a~ the cause.
<br />I\AS:~,"S responst' LO the Challenger disaster (Pre~idell-
<br />tiat Commissiun 1986) sho,,",,'ed a t)'pical response-
<br />failure was attributed to lechnical problems, limiled
<br />resources, and p?Ltical problems, and not to flawed
<br />dpo~ion m:l.kinl! ill.adel1uate inf()nT!ation flows. -and
<br />
<br />,'. -II;', 'f lJ S:::":'::~PS f=-,(~;...,)1.C'.1 ,":,,~;:
<br />
<br />1,:l()rUJ(I~lu:\y.,ll:d~,'rLlt::tu!'e()rlll: L.J :~L...r(l\::"{
<br />IT-:l)_ T\\'u e\pi:ill.11j{IIIS iJ:l\(" tr_.C'o J(,\"~tn(C'd t{
<br />pbin t.he rl.:luctallce ur illJ.uililY of burcJ.lIcr:::Jcies to ,:-
<br />formulate their underslandiIlg of prohleIl\::' and SlIli;1'
<br />UOIl~. Firsl. people who recognize the rlc("d In ;ll'-
<br />proach a problem or situation differently often lad
<br />the power lO be heard in the bureaucracy. Second. ,..
<br />hureall(J"(l(l( organizalioll is hy oefimtioll a set of n:-
<br />strict.ions. for focu~lIlg attenUOIl and for nalTowing lilt'
<br />cOf-.'11Iti\'e style 10 certain a(ccplcd sl:md;lnl opn<f!ill~
<br />pr.:~{.dl.j',:-'s (hJu. ~nJ Kahil 19:-S. Dougl;JS IYSll). The
<br />P'l:.",)' f{'r;l. ,\\':Jf'r ~t':n(1l or h'I1.:! the prplllcm i~ ;JIH!
<br />..\.'!l;.li ;H'-~rlt"d :,_.)'\;t;nn..; !JJ~gia be '''In' ~l"'\l'n.:h- L: : cd
<br />("t't.: LI,,<,well Elf 11. LC:ll"niII,L: and improved pcrl(j!"-
<br />mance are blocked. The consequences for species rt'-
<br />CQvcf)' may be disastrous.
<br />
<br />Organizational Learning. AVOiding Blockages
<br />
<br />()rganizalional theory dt"scnoc~ llil\\ org,<jlliz;.JtI()11'
<br />learn ;md Impr<l\"C their pcrformallCt' h~' ch;mgmg III
<br />mt'"t'l dJiemrn;l.'i (:\rg~TI~ and SChllll 1~171". Lrhen.:d,l!t
<br />1 ~lb.-l)_ This lheory call he rlil n:tl~. applied 10 illl-
<br />pro\'ln~ bure:mcr;Jtic Ilcr!(lrmance ill endangt."re(l
<br />speocs n'cO\'elY_ To learn to .!'olve dilemmas, an org,l-
<br />mzatioll must change it.sclf by learning how to acquill'
<br />new go.lls_ norms. ana poli(jcs for jt.sdf. h must bc
<br />aide LU txammc its o\,n stlllCtUre aud upcl-ation:.!
<br />!_'IL".~ll.'><-" .ll.u ;l,j.... l.~ ~.,U{:l. .c:i.~;c. to ih:" ..1'_<-1'::
<br />pllshmem of itS tasks, It must ensure th<.lt data Oil II'.
<br />performance are recorded. colleGed. and con\'ertetl.
<br />illto informalion that rebtes meaningfull~' lO tbl' spc-
<br />cdic ta~k_ Many urganizauon:11 researchers havt" no led
<br />that mOs.l org<H1II..lt..iom, do not learn in this way (e_g..
<br />Janis Iq7~. \'Van.\id. 197:>, [uioni 1975, Etheredge
<br />19t-;:i. \\"esinllll /98G. DOllgr:l~ rqSG), Dcry (19tH. pp.
<br />~)()-IO~) descrilX'd several ways in which organization..
<br />trpiC1I1~' avoid learning. largely or ignoring the d:n~
<br />necessary for error deteClion_ For exampte, he dt-
<br />scribes common patterns built into organizational cul-
<br />tures and structures. such as pressures for conformity.
<br />that IlIml communication within the organil..]tion. thu....
<br />block..ing lhe organization's perception of key part.s of
<br />ilo; euemal en\'ironmenl. '''hat type of data do organi.
<br />zatiuns recognize as evidence that they have made an
<br />error? The answer is nOL dear, but in politicized
<br />!lpecies n:con:ry programs. ulere is a tendency to diS-
<br />miss or dl.scount dal<t about poor performance, espe-
<br />cialh- \\-hen It I~ obtained by other orgamzations (e.g..
<br />Weinberg- 1986)_ Numerous pressures cause people to
<br />recugnize certain errors and nOI Olhers. Inoeed, Schun
<br />(l:IS:~) coined the term "selective mallenLlon" to de-
<br />
<br />."
<br />
|