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<br />Of.l2544
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<br />) ':. I rt"l:, .,\"" ;~,"i( _' . '::;.'. ", If J,.~":r~j\ a;,'~ =.."
<br />jl.,,,,_ :j...'l<':l~,. jl:\t.!~.. or fXWI;'" u! \'In,: Jbi!:~:, [0_ l:l:C'
<br />prCl roles and rc:spol1!'ibilJlies: professIOnal conllin
<br />management: .md an oriem.:H1on to",'ard Idrgl" rather
<br />th;m p::J.rochial or se.lf-promoting goals (Galhr.-wh
<br />1977). Maier (1967. in Galbrail~ 1917. p. 156) ,um,,,,,.
<br />rize the role: "'CoordmalOrs] must be receptive 10 ill-
<br />lonnat.ion contributed. accepl comrihUlium \\'ithOlJl
<br />evaluating them. . . . summarize mformatioll 10 taClh.
<br />L.lrt inreJ::TaLion. slHllulalC exrloralory beha,'ior. crecHe
<br />O:!h';;reIlCSs of problem" (If OIlC member by (;[h('r~. :md
<br />rl~;,..:c; ""!lL'n [!It' !!10UP ;~. re<ld~' If' rt.'....t'~\.e d;Ut:ll'!IC-':"~
<br />and arree [0 a unified splt:!ion," The sllcccs~flll rec(Jld
<br />of p;Jrallcl org;tnlzauoll<, ~Ilrl co()rdlll;JlOrs III the pn-
<br />\,ale seelor offers promise for improved species reo
<br />co\'ery programs (see Pelen and \'Vaterman I YB2.
<br />Kanter '9R~. Calhra;,h 1977. Miller 197R).
<br />
<br />Declslon.Making: Avo:dlng "Grouplhlnk
<br />
<br />~peci("s recovery demands hig-h-qU.IIII\. el'!('(II\"(:.
<br />ann timeh deci...ion making.. BeGHI....c Ihe C()Il~t"(I'I(:IlC("...
<br />of mismanagement are so high for lhe SpCClC~ .1no lor
<br />ule decision Ill:tkcrs themselves. it is essenri:ll to gll.lrrl
<br />against defecti\'e decision m;lkillg. Bodl tht" 1)I(><:e......
<br />and product<; of decision mak.ing can be gre;Jlh' flawed
<br />.. (nO!: the space shullk _CJwllrllgn cas~: Pn:sidclHl.d
<br />Comfr1IS~IOIl J~'86,l. hur ~s BelIn and \';lUj>C! (J~l~:.!. p.
<br />3VL) nmt':d, mm.t d(:cis.ion~ are "made qUld.h' :It.li. 11\
<br />fonnaJly, "iu) little or no explicil analysts."
<br />Organizational structure is the single gre;lle."( infliJ-
<br />t"nce on hO\'\' decision making is carried OIJI alld. ulll-
<br />maldy, on ho"' an agency performs. The ~Ht::. a." h'ell
<br />as we style, of decision mak.ing i~ de(ermincn by org;t-
<br />niz.ational strucllIre. III bureaucracies, tbe slle uf d('C1-
<br />sion making is high up the hicr;JTChic."l) b.lInn. ;md i\
<br />i~ carried OUI by people "'ho are ohen rhrsic;)II~' rc-
<br />moved from much of the t.."lsk environment ...nd who
<br />are lea~t in contacl .....itli iLS essential detaiJ..... Informa'
<br />tion oflen comes lO them distilled and ahstr;1Cled
<br />through the organization's own ideology and CIlIt IIrt"
<br />as it is passed up the hierarchy, biased 1U""(:lrd cen.ain
<br />types of informauon and an interpretauon thaI sup-
<br />portS the bureaucracy's basic premises and goals
<br />(Douglas 1986).
<br />Odum (1982) commenled that incremelllal decision
<br />making-thai is, many small, apparently indepellrlcnl
<br />decisions-can become a big decision as .11) aCCH.'lioll
<br />(If the many small decisions. This "t~T..lnn~' of small
<br />decisions" (Kahn 1966) can greatl~' affect rt:C()Vcn: pn,-
<br />grams unless s~'s!ematically guarded against.
<br />Group deciSion making is common. Advisory leams
<br />
<br />I
<br />!
<br />
<br />f-.C:L.:OV':':. ;. ;..-,
<br />
<br />.,; .(
<br />
<br />I:,: i. ,~(: t', c.: I
<br />
<br />i: ". ~. .-, r I
<br />
<br />;;:\ ;1 C..);l:':;j\Cik.:.. t"lrcs_'\LI\.:: tu ;:,.jL'":: ((I:"" I
<br />nonn~, unexamined ;]~sumpli0ns, hidden ;tgcn[b~.
<br />ami vanous other suhtle conStrainL<' limit F roup
<br />l!lembcrs from exercising critical powcrs and IrO'll ('~.-
<br />}' 'l_::.,jng ti(lllb~:. cj"crdy \\'11I:n 1..1'< (;~ilCr people . !tJ.
<br />GCaSillll'nl:.JkJng group seem to h<lve reached J ((111-
<br />sensus. He Gills this "'grouplhink," wherein pt:oJ->le
<br />o\'emde their moti\'alion l(l appraise alleruin.i\.c
<br />cour:-es of aCtion re3listic.ally (.Janis 1972). This nClt'n-
<br />(,,;\lion of menLl1 effiCIency. rt:<!lit\' [CSLjllg. ;md .i.ILl.c~-
<br />fTl(';)( rt'~lll1s in prcITla!lJn~' d('~~llre of Ille rf(ll'I(':'~ .1'
<br />that the full Ulng<: of sOlur;I\!IS ro a problem is l){'\'el
<br />explort:'d (lams 1972)
<br />Al least six major decision-making defect" COII-
<br />lribute lo failures 1O soh'e problems adequalel)", ac-
<br />cording to Janis (J972). First. lhe decisiun group limits
<br />discussion to one or t....o courses of aClion, ....'ilholll
<br />awareness or examinatjon of the lull range of ailelll(j-
<br />liVes. Thi'\ is common II) hllreauu<lcies_ Secollo. tilt"
<br />gruup bils t\I rcappr;Jist" the course or acrion th:H 11
<br />iniliall)' preferred even ",hen associaled ri!.ks alld
<br />dra"'oJck.. cmt'rgc later. Third. the group continues In
<br />neglect cour~cs of action thLlt it iniLially evalualed ;)"
<br />unsatisfactory. The group spe'nds no Lime e\'aluCllin:-:
<br />\,'hether ~il has O\'er lo<ikt"d mi'nobnous benefits 0)'
<br />whethcr il has r('"duced dl(: (l)it;i,)~d proble.rns and (O.'.L<;
<br />;l~~"'Jt.i.Hed wl~h i.J1'_ earl:('r d~:,.:,,~,~~d :i:',\,:: I-',\l,\-~"
<br />Fourth. the decision group makes little or no iHlempl
<br />LU seck ;Jno use information from expefLo;; who Gill
<br />provide valuable insights into ule gains ;md COSL... (:lSSP-
<br />uatcd \,\'irh ahernaLi\'e courses of acLioll. fiflh, the dr-
<br />cision group sho",'s ;J seleclive Gi;JS lOVo"ards those f;JCI~
<br />and opinions Lhat suppon Lhelr initially preferred
<br />}--'")l..)licy. MemlJers di::.cus.s their pTeferreclahernalive lJUI
<br />tend to igllore facL<;. and opinions that question or con-
<br />tradiCl their initiallr preferred policy. Sixth, the group
<br />fails (0 work OUl contingency plans to cope .....ith ob.
<br />\;OUS and foreseeable setback~ that could result in a
<br />failed program. The members spend li,Lle time deli.
<br />beraling about ho..... the preferred polley might be tem-
<br />porarily or pennaneml)' derailed b~' accidents, hin-
<br />dered by bureaucratic inertia, or saootaged br political
<br />opponenLs. These six defecLs mus! be avoided in re-
<br />coveT)' progr<ims.
<br />Janis (l 9i2) li~ts eight symplnms of grouprhink th::ll
<br />often appear in high-level bureaucratic decision-
<br />maker~, and there is e\idence of these in some rt'-
<br />co\'ef)' programs: an illusion of correaness; colle'(11\.t"
<br />effon.s to rationalize, Lhus discounting warnings and
<br />3\oiding a reconsider.n.ion or assumptions: an unqll(,,~-
<br />,I" .
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