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<br />i <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br /> <br />The Brownell Task Force and the Mexican Salinity Problem: <br />A Narrative Chronology of Events <br /> <br />Introduction <br /> <br />Seventeen years ago this summer, in June 1974, President Nixon signed into law P.L. 93-320, <br />the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act. Title I of the Act authorized the Federal <br />Governmnet to take measures to eliminate the effects of brackish return flows (or drainage) from <br />the WeIIton-Mohawk irrigation project on water delivered to Mexico under a 1944 treaty <br />allocating the waters of the Rio Grande, Tijuana, and Colorado Rivers between the U.S. and its <br />southern neighbor. At the heart of the Title I program was a 100 million gallon-per-day (mgd) <br />desalting plant to be built at a site near Yuma, Arizona. The desalting plant was to be the <br />solution to a water quality dispute that had periodically troubled U.S.-Mexican relations since <br />1961. <br /> <br />The Yuma Desalting Plant was to remove 90 percent of the dissolved salts from the return <br />flows, by a process called reverse osmosis. This desalted water was then to be blended with the <br />remaining drainage to yield water of the quality guaranteed Mexico under a 1973 Minute to the <br />original treaty, Minute No. 242. The estimated capital cost of the plant, along with other <br />measures called for in Title I, was estimated at slightly under $100 million at the time of <br />authorization. <br /> <br />Completion of the plant is now thirteen years behind the original schedule. Its capital cost has <br />risen to more than $400 million, and projected yearly operation and maintenance costs range <br />from $10 million to $33 million. The blended waters to be delivered to Mexico may cost as <br />much as $500 per acre-foot to produce. I <br /> <br />Why did the Federal government choose such a costly-and risky-means to implement an <br />international agreement? To answer that question, we must look at the history of that <br />decision-the people involved, their perspectives and limitations, the courses of action they <br />believed were available, and the constraints under which they worked. But first, what was the <br />problem they were solving-or thought they were solving? <br /> <br />EmMgenceof~eSaHnftY~$ue <br /> <br />The treaty that guaranteed Mexico 1.5 million acre-feet of Colorado River water annually "from <br />any and all sources" did not specify its salinity. The salinity of water used for irrigation water <br />is often critical to agricultural productivity, as high concentrations of salt reduce crop yields and <br />may preclude the growing of salt-sensitive crops such as tomatoes and lettuce. Because Mexico <br /> <br />1 <br />