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I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Daniel F. Lawrence Utah The chief purpose of the Committee of Fourteen was to consult on matters regarding the 1944 Water Treaty with Mexico. I became involved in the Brownell Task Force and the negotiations culminating in Minute No. 242 when [then-Chairman from Arizona] Wes Steiner convened the Committee at the request of mwc Commissioner Friedkin. The 1944 Water Treaty was developed with input from the Basin States, all of whom wanted to maintain the sanctity of the 1922 Colorado River Compact. When we first heard about the Task Force, which was under the direction of the State Department, we were alarmed that an agency with a different perspective [than IBWC] might be tempted to give water away to satisfy Mexican concerns. Stealing our upstream storage for dilution was certainly a prominent option. While we had reluctantly allowed use of stored water as a temporary measure [under Minutes No. 218 and 241], we were absolutely opposed to it as a long-term solution. During the period when the Task Force was working, we met with them several times as a group; I had no private contact with them. I remember that the Task Force did tour the area. The Committee also held several meetings with Commissioner Friedkin during which he briefed us on the progress of the Task Force and later the negotiations, and consulted with us on various issues. These meetings, like other meetings that were not limited to the states alone, were usually attended by representatives of the Bureau of Reclamation and the Office of Saline Water. The solution recommended by President Nixon reflects the states' tough lobbying job against the use of upstream storage. Building a desalting plant appeared to be the only other choice. The non structural alternative [partial buy-out and improving irrigation efficiency at Wellton-Mohawk] would have affected farmers in Arizona, and their representatives opposed it. There was also some question about its effectiveness, both in our eyes and those of the Mexicans. After all, Mexican acceptance of the terms of Minute No. 242 was based on their appraisal of how it would benefit them. Desalting was more popular then, too. There was some euphoria about the new technology, and the cost estimates for the plant were far, far below reality. No one was looking closely at the numbers or the potential problems. You can't ask why people agreed to spend $400 million on a desalting plant-they didn't. As to Minute No. 242, it is based on salt balance. The figure of 115 ppm was just hammered out, and the + 30 ppm to allow leeway. We didn't believe the Mexican farmers should be given an advantage over U.S. farmers in the salinity of the water they received. In the end, we were very satisfied. For people who were supposed to be fighting over Colorado River water, we developed a solid, seven-state comity and a mutual determination to keep our political problems out of the debate. We recognized our common interests and stuck to our guns, even though California faced difficult intrastate problems. (Myron Holburt did a superb job.) We prevailed by diligence, and sold the solution to our governors and representatives. B-5