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B-2 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 Floyd A. Bishop Wyoming One thing the report does not perhaps reflect is that there were significant differences among the Basin States. Many of us felt that the Wellton-Mohawk project should be cut back [bought out] because the drainage was ridiculously high in salt. It was a good solution, but it never did fly. We had very extensive deliberations though we did come to agreement in the end. During the Task Force deliberations, we felt that the matter was somewhat out of our hands. I thought the Committee of Fourteen had some influence early on, but very little after the State Department became involved. I did not tour Yuma with Brownell-I don't remember that Committee of Fourteen members were invited to participate-and I had no private conversations with him or any member of the Task Force during that period. The final solution did not affect Wyoming adversely, though it was inordinately expensive. We were more concerned about being able to develop our water, and that numerical water quality standards for upstream states should not be part of the agreement. We opposed the long-term use of upstream storage as a solution-that would have had serious implications for Upper Basin development and particularly for Wyoming, which had the most unused water. Among the other measures proposed, I thought the canal lining was a sensible step. I felt that improvements in irrigation efficiency were inevitable, but would be of more limited benefit in solving the salinity problem that their supporters believed. The desalting plant was the easiest way out, though it was a substantial burden on the Federal government-how substantial we didn't then realize. We had faith in the desalting technology, and believed that improvements would reduce costs. Our hopes, obviously, didn't materialize.