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<br />Rivers for the vastly expanded hydropower production they
<br />promise themselves by 1960. The Bratsk and Krasnoyarsk
<br />stations, each designed to 3,200,000-kilowatt capacity (Grand
<br />Coulee has 2 million kilowatts), are listed as only the initial 2
<br />of many Siberian producers in what appears to be planned as a
<br />stupendous electrometallurgical and electrochemical complex.
<br />The entire Soviet power endeavor, the literature and propa-
<br />ganda reiterates, is undertaken on a self-contained basis WIth the
<br />philosophy that the essential generators, turbines, cement, steel,
<br />lines, hardware, etc., must be produced internally by the econ-
<br />omy they are designed to augment. Also the essential skills, engi-
<br />neering and technical talent, are to be produced nationally. They
<br />are to come from a conglomeration of institutes, colleges, and
<br />research centers. VariatIOns on United States of America scien-
<br />tific and technical J!rocedure are reported, but no new basic dis-
<br />coveries of scientIfic facts with which this committee is not
<br />familiar. Nothing in the nature of a "scientific breakthrou~h"
<br />is reported. Heavy machinery, mechanization, and constructIon
<br />practices are employed in a fashion not identical but basically
<br />similar to the United States.
<br />(The British, Indian, and United Nations versions are herein set
<br />:forth in some detail because they have the virtue of eyewitness origin,
<br />not similarly enjoyed by any United States officials to this reporter's
<br />knowledge, and further to insulate data and conclusions from any o:f
<br />the emotIOns and repercussions o:f what is termed the "public versus
<br />private power" conflicts the committee is invariably confronted with
<br />in considering this subject on a domestic basis. British, Indian, and
<br />U. N. officials are deemed unaffected, disinterested in, and :frequently
<br />simply mystified by that conflict which is primarily an all-American
<br />luxury not for export and, therefore, not pertinent to or discussed in
<br />this study.)
<br />
<br />U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE REPORT
<br />
<br />The U. S. Department of Commerce (European Division, Bureau
<br />of Foreign Commerce) data on the Soviet economy's last report is that
<br />from 1955 to 1956 total U. S. S. R. power went :from 170.1 billion
<br />to 192 billion kilowatt-hours, a 13-percent rise. The hydroelectric
<br />( as differentiated from total power, including thermal) , for the ;paral-
<br />lel year rose from 23.1 billion to 29 billion kilowatt-hours, whICh, in
<br />percentage, is 25 percent, or double the overall power increase. .
<br />The same analysts, on a longer time basis of 2'1" years as an item
<br />o:f Soviet industrIal production, list U. S. S. R. electric production as
<br />skyrocketing from 5 billion kilowatt-hours in 1928 to 170.1 billion in
<br />1955 for a 3,402.0-percent increase. The Russian power emphasis is
<br />:further reflected in this study by the fact that the kilowatt increase
<br />is about triple the U. S. S. R. coal, pig iron, steel, or cement in-
<br />creases, used statistically in the identical study as key indexes of Soviet.
<br />industrial production in identical periods.
<br />
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